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Voice matters in a dictator game

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Tetsuo Yamamori ,
Kazuhiko Kato ,
Toshiji Kawagoe  and
Akihiko Matsui
Tetsuo Yamamori*
Affiliation:
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, Graduate School of Economics, University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-8654, Japan
Kazuhiko Kato*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Economics, Asia University, 5-24-10 Sakai, Musashino-shi, Tokyo 180-8629, Japan
Toshiji Kawagoe*
Affiliation:
Department of Complex Systems, Future University-Hakodate, 116-2 Kameda Nakano-cho, Hakodate city, Hokkaido 041-8655, Japan
Akihiko Matsui*
Affiliation:
Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo, 7-3-1 Hongo, Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113-8654, Japan
*
e-mail: [email protected]
e-mail: [email protected]
e-mail: [email protected]
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

We conducted a laboratory experiment to study the effects of communication in a dictator game, while maintaining subjects’ anonymity. In the experiment, the recipient has an opportunity to state a payoff-irrelevant request for his/her share before the dictator dictates his/her offer. We found that the independence hypothesis that voice does not matter is rejected. In particular, if the request is for less than half of the pie, the dictator's offer increases as the recipient's request increases. Additionally, there is no dictator who is other-regarding and, at the same time, does not react to the recipient's request.

Keywords

CommunicationVoiceDictator gameEconomic experiment

JEL classification

D64: Altruism • Philanthropy • Intergenerational Transfers C91: Laboratory, Individual Behavior C72: Noncooperative Games
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 11 , Issue 4 , December 2008 , pp. 336 - 343
Copyright
Copyright © 2007 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-007-9168-y) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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