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A live experiment on approval voting

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Jean-François Laslier  and
Karine Van der Straeten
Jean-François Laslier*
Affiliation:
CNRS, Ecole Polytechnique, 1 Rue Descartes, 75005 Paris, France
Karine Van der Straeten*
Affiliation:
CNRS, Ecole Polytechnique, 1 Rue Descartes, 75005 Paris, France
*
e-mail: [email protected]
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper presents a large-scale experiment on the Approval Voting rule that took place during the 2002 French presidential election. We describe the experiment and its main results. The findings are as follows: (i) Such an experiment is feasible, and very well accepted by voters. (ii) The principle of approval voting is easily understood and accepted. (iii) Within the observed political context, compared to the official first-round vote, approval voting modifies the overall ranking of candidates. (iv) The candidates Le Pen and Chirac, more than the others, were able to convert approval votes into official first-round votes.

Keywords

Approval votingFrench politicsExperimentsVoting rules

JEL classification

C93: Field Experiments D70: General D72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , March 2008 , pp. 97 - 105
Copyright
Copyright © 2008 Economic Science Association

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