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The effects of endowment size and strategy method on third party punishment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Jillian Jordan ,
Katherine McAuliffe  and
David Rand
Jillian Jordan*
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, Yale University, 1 Prospect Street, New Haven, CT 06511, USA
Katherine McAuliffe
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, Yale University, 1 Prospect Street, New Haven, CT 06511, USA Psychology Department, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA 02467, USA
David Rand
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, Yale University, 1 Prospect Street, New Haven, CT 06511, USA Economics Department, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511, USA School of Management, Yale University, New Haven, CT 06511, USA
*
[email protected]
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Abstract

Numerous experiments have shown that people often engage in third-party punishment (3PP) of selfish behavior. This evidence has been used to argue that people respond to selfishness with anger, and get utility from punishing those who mistreat others. Elements of the standard 3PP experimental design, however, allow alternative explanations: it has been argued that 3PP could be motivated by envy (as selfish dictators earn high payoffs), or could be influenced by the use of the strategy method (which is known to influence second-party punishment). Here we test these alternatives by varying the third party’s endowment and the use of the strategy method, and measuring punishment. We find that while third parties do report more envy when they have lower endowments, neither manipulation significantly affects punishment. We also show that punishment is associated with ratings of anger but not of envy. Thus, our results suggest that 3PP is not an artifact of self-focused envy or use of the strategy method. Instead, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that 3PP is motivated by anger.

Keywords

CooperationNorm-enforcementStrategy methodEmotionsFairnessEconomic games
Type
Original Paper
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 19 , Issue 4 , December 2016 , pp. 741 - 763
Copyright
Copyright © 2015 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-015-9466-8) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

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