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Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?—An experimental analysis

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 March 2025

Max Albert ,
Werner Güth ,
Erich Kirchler  and
Boris Maciejovsky
Max Albert*
Affiliation:
Saarland University, Economic Theory, PO Box 15 11 50, D-66041 Saarbrücken, Germany
Werner Güth*
Affiliation:
Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group, Kahlaische Str. 10, D-07745 Jena, Germany
Erich Kirchler*
Affiliation:
University of Vienna, Faculty of Psychology, Economic Psychology, Universitätsstrasse 7, A-1010 Vienna, Austria
Boris Maciejovsky*
Affiliation:
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management, 38 Memorial Drive, E56-345b, Cambridge, MA 02142
*
e-mail: [email protected]
e-mail: [email protected]
e-mail: [email protected]
e-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

We experimentally investigate whether individuals can reliably detect cooperators (the nice(r) people) in an anonymous decision environment involving “connected games.” Participants can condition their choices in an asymmetric prisoners’ dilemma and a trust game on past individual (their partner's donation share to a self-selected charity) and social (whether their partner belongs to a group with high or low average donations) information. Thus, the two measures of niceness are the individual donation share in the donation task, and the cooperativeness of one's choice in the two games. We find that high donors achieve a higher-than-average expected payoff by cooperating predominantly with other high donors. Group affiliation proved to be irrelevant.

Keywords

Game theoryConditional cooperationConnected gamesDonation behavior
Type
Research Article
Information
Experimental Economics , Volume 10 , Issue 1 , March 2007 , pp. 53 - 69
Copyright
Copyright © 2007 Economic Science Association

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Footnotes

Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9131-3.

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