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Why Institutions Matter: From Economic Development to Development Economics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 June 2014

Cosmin Marinescu
Cosmin Marinescu*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Bucharest Academy of Economic Studies (A.S.E.), 6 Romană Square, 010374, Bucharest, Romania. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

The last few decades have seen a significant growth of economists’ interest in studying institutions. They are generally preoccupied with explaining institutions using instruments that are specific for an economist, and especially with discerning the significance of institutions for both economic development and development economics. Therefore, the integration of institutions into economic theory is an essential step in our continuous attempt to refine and improve scientific explanations. The neoclassical theory of economic growth only identifies the conditions needed for material production growth, such as capital accumulation and technical progress. In order to explain ‘why’ people save, invest, learn and seek useful knowledge, special attention must also be paid to institutional and value systems.

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Articles
Information
European Review , Volume 22 , Issue 3 , July 2014 , pp. 469 - 490
Copyright
Copyright © Academia Europaea 2014 

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References

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