Introduction

Abstract

International trials of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide are currently a matter of considerable interest – legal, political and human. The work of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda (ICTY and ICTR), set up respectively in 1993 and 1994, and the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) at the Hague in 2002, have focused attention on the practice and value of such juridical processes both as forms of law and in terms of the events they address. The unexpected death of Slobodan Milosevic during his trial at the ICTY has only intensified the controversy aroused by such proceedings. Politics, history, memory, mourning, reparation and even reconciliation are inescapably part of the legal process, often in an explicit and even formal manner. This means that scholars in disciplines other than legal science and people from many backgrounds are interested in the work of such international tribunals and in the types of ‘truth’ that they seek to establish.

Such trials are not new. The idea stems directly from the intersection of military violence and humanitarian impulses in the 19th century. Geneva law, emanating from the International Red Cross (founded after the main war of Italian unification), dealt with the humane treatment of wounded and prisoners. Hague law, which codified the conduct of belligerents towards non-combatants, grew from the Lieber Code devised by the Union during the American Civil War and from the attempts by European powers to regulate military conduct after the Franco-Prussian War, culminating in the Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907.