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¿Síndrome de Munchausen por poderes o “error de la justicia”? Aplicación preliminar de la neuroimagen funcional para diferenciar entre culpabilidad e inocencia

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 May 2020

Sean A. Spence ,
Catherine J. Kaylor-Hughes ,
Martin L. Brook ,
Sudheer T. Lankappa  and
Iain D. Wilkinson
Sean A. Spence
Affiliation:
Psiquiatría Clínica, Universidad de Sheffield, Centro Longley, Norwood Grange Drive, SheffieldS5 7JT, Reino Unido
Catherine J. Kaylor-Hughes
Affiliation:
Psiquiatría Clínica, Universidad de Sheffield, Centro Longley, Norwood Grange Drive, SheffieldS5 7JT, Reino Unido
Martin L. Brook
Affiliation:
Psiquiatría Clínica, Universidad de Sheffield, Centro Longley, Norwood Grange Drive, SheffieldS5 7JT, Reino Unido
Sudheer T. Lankappa
Affiliation:
Psiquiatría Clínica, Universidad de Sheffield, Centro Longley, Norwood Grange Drive, SheffieldS5 7JT, Reino Unido
Iain D. Wilkinson
Affiliation:
Psiquiatría Clínica, Universidad de Sheffield, Centro Longley, Norwood Grange Drive, SheffieldS5 7JT, Reino Unido
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Resumen

El “síndrome de Munchausen por poderes” se refiere, en general, a mujeres acusadas de haber inventado o producido enfermedades en niños bajo su cuidado, destinadas a atraer la atención sobre sí misma. Cuando hay pruebas concluyentes, hay dudas sobre la etiología de la enfermedad, pero cuando no hay pruebas, el diagnóstico depende de la negación de la intencionalidad (conducta también compatible con la inocencia). ¿Cómo podrían los investigadores conseguir pruebas objetivas sobre culpabilidad o inocencia? En este artículo analizamos el caso de una mujer condenada por envenenar a su hija. Cumplió la condena en la cárcel, pero sigue reclamando su inocencia. Usando un protocolo modificado de RMf (publicado ya en 2001) realizamos la prueba de neuroimagen mientras ella confirmaba su versión de los acontecimientos y mientras aceptaba la de sus acusadores. Sugerimos la hipótesis de que los tiempos de respuesta serían más largos y se asociaran con mayor activación de la corteza cingular anterior y prefrontal ventrolateral cuando hacía declaraciones falsas (es decir, cuando “mentía”). La mujer fue sometida 4 veces a RM de 3 teslas. Los resultados revelaron tiempos de respuesta considerablemente más largos y un activación relativamente mayor de la corteza cingular anterior y prefrontal ventrolateral cuando aceptaba la versión de los acontecimientos de sus acusadores. Es decir que aunque no hemos “probado” que esta mujer es inocente, demostramos que sus parámetros conductuales y funcionales anatómicos se comportan como si lo fuera.

Keywords

Síndrome de Munchausen por poderesEnfermedad simulada o inducidaError de la justiciaRMfCorteza prefrontal VentrolateralCorteza cingular anteriorTiempo de respuestaEnfermedad facticia o inducidaMentiraVerdad
Type
Artículo original
Information
European Psychiatry (Ed. Española) , Volume 15 , Issue 7 , October 2008 , pp. 347 - 353
Copyright
Copyright © European Psychiatric Association 2008

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