Hostname: page-component-78c5997874-mlc7c Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-13T00:44:14.709Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Under which conditions does spending on active labor market policies increase? An fsQCA analysis of 53 governments between 1985 and 2003

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2011

Barbara Vis
Barbara Vis*
Affiliation:
Department of Political Science, VU University Amsterdam, De Boelelaan 1081, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands
*
* E-mail: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

This article examines the conditions under which governments increase spending on active labor market policies (ALMPs), as the European Union and the organization of economic co-operation and development recommend. Given that ALMPs are usually expensive and unlikely to win a government many votes, this study hypothesizes that an improving socio-economic situation is a necessary condition for increased spending. On the basis of the data of 53 governments from 18 established democracies between 1985 and 2003, the fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis shows that there are different combinations of conditions, or routes, toward activation and that an improving socio-economic situation is needed for each of them. Specifically, the analysis reveals that governments activate under decreasing unemployment combined with (1) trade openness, or (2) the absence of corporatism in the case of leftist governments, or (3) the presence of corporatism in the case of rightist governments. These findings advance our understanding of the politics of labor market reform.

Keywords

welfare state reformALMPsFsQCAgovernments decision-makingpolicymaking
Type
Research Article
Information
European Political Science Review , Volume 3 , Issue 2 , July 2011 , pp. 229 - 252
Copyright
Copyright © European Consortium for Political Research 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Adams, J., Clark, M., Ezrow, L. Glasgow, G. (2004), ‘Understanding change and stability in party ideologies: do parties respond to public opinion or to past election results?’, British Journal of Political Science 34(4): 589–610.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Adams, J., Haupt, A.B. Stoll, H. (2009), ‘What moves parties? The role of public opinion and global economic conditions in Western Europe’, Comparative Political Studies 42(5): 611–639.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Allan, J.P. Scruggs, L.A. (2004), ‘Political partisanship and welfare state reform in advanced industrial democracies’, American Journal of Political Science 48(3): 496–512.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Anderson, C.J. (2009), ‘The private consequences of public policies: active labor market policies and social ties in Europe’, European Political Science Review 1(3): 341–373.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Armingeon, K. Bonoli, G. (eds) (2006), The Politics of Post Industrial Welfare States: Adapting Post War Social Policies to New Social Risks, London and New York: Routledge.Google Scholar
Armingeon, K. (2007), ‘Active labour market policy, international organizations and domestic politics’, Journal of European Public Policy 14(6): 905–932.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Armingeon, K. Giger, N. (2008), ‘Conditional punishment: a comparative analysis of the electoral consequences of welfare state retrenchment in OECD nations, 1980–2003’, West European Politics 31(3): 558–580.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Armingeon, K., Gerber, M., Leimgruber, P., Beyeler, M. (2008), ‘Comparative political data set 1960–2006’. Institute of Political Science, University of Berne. Retrieved October 2008 from http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.htmlGoogle Scholar
Bennett, A. Elman, C. (2006), ‘Qualitative research: recent developments in case study methods’, Annual Review of Political Science 9: 455–476.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bonoli, G. (2008), ‘The political economy of activation: explaining crossnational variation in active labour market policy’, Working Paper De l’IDHEAP 1–21.Google Scholar
Budge, I., Klingemann, H., Volkens, A., Bara, J. Tanenbaum, E. (2001), Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945–1998, Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cameron, D.R. (1978), ‘The expansion of the public economy: a comparative analysis’, American Political Science Review 72(4): 1243–1261.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clark, W.R., Gilligan, M.J. Golder, M. (2006), ‘A simple multivariate test for asymmetric hypotheses’, Political Analysis 14(3): 311–331.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clasen, J. (2005), Reforming European Welfare States: Germany and the United Kingdom Compared, Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cox, R.H. (1998), ‘From safety net to trampoline: labor market activation in the Netherlands and Denmark’, Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 11(4): 397–414.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Eurobarometer 56.1 (2001), ‘Social exclusion and modernization of pension systems’. Eurobarometer Survey Series, principal investigator Christensen, T., conducted by European Opinion Research Group, Brussels. Cologne, Germany: Zentralarchiv fur Empirische Sozialforschung [producer], 2006. Cologne, Germany: Zentralarchiv fur Empirische Sozialforschung/Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributors], 2006-10-18. Retrieved 26 October 2009 from http://dx.doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03475CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Franzese, R.J. Hays, J. (2006), ‘Strategic interaction among EU governments in active labor market policymaking’, European Union Politics 7(2): 167–189.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gaston, N. Rajaguru, G. (2008), ‘The rise (and fall) of labour market programmes: domestic vs. global factors’, Oxford Economic Papers 60(4): 619–648.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Huber, E. Stephens, J.D. (2001), Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Huo, J., Nelson, M. Stephens, J.D. (2008), ‘Decommodification and activation in social democratic policy: resolving the paradox’, Journal of European Social Policy 18(1): 5–20.Google Scholar
Iversen, T. (2005), Capitalism, Democracy, and Welfare, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Katzenstein, P. (1985), Small States in World Markets: Industrial Policy in Europe, Ithaca and New York: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Katzenstein, P. (2003), ‘Small states and small states revisited’, New Political Economy 8(1): 9–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Keman, H., Van Kersbergen, K. Vis, B. (2006), ‘Political parties and new social risks: the double backlash against social democracy and christian democracy’, in K. Armingeon and B. Giuliano (eds), The Politics of Post-Industrial Welfare States: Adapting Post-War Social Policies to New Social Risks, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 27–51.Google Scholar
Kenworthy, L. (2001), ‘Wage setting coordination scores’. Retrieved 15 April 2010 from http://www.u.arizona.edu/~lkenwor/data.htmlGoogle Scholar
Kenworthy, L. (2002), ‘Corporatism and unemployment in the 1980s and 1990s’, American Sociological Review 67(3): 367–388.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kenworthy, L. (2003), ‘Quantitative indicators of corporatism’, International Journal of Sociology 33(3): 10–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kitschelt, H. (1999), ‘European social democracy between political economy and electoral competition’, in H. Kitschelt et al. (eds), Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 317–345.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kluve, J. (2006), ‘The effectiveness of European active labor market policy’, IZA Discussion Paper Series, no. 2018. Retrieved 15 April 2010 from ftp://repec.iza.org/RePEc/Discussionpaper/dp2018.pdfGoogle Scholar
Mahoney, J. Goertz, G. (2006), ‘A tale of two cultures: contrasting qualitative and quantitative research’, Political Analysis 14(3): 227–249.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Martin, C.J. (2004), ‘Corporatism from the firm perspective: employers and social policy in Denmark and Britain’, British Journal of Political Science 35(1): 127–148.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Martin, J.P. (2000), ‘What works among active labour market policies: evidence from OECD countries’ experiences’, OECD Economic Studies 30(I): 79–113.Google Scholar
Martin, C.J. Swank, D. (2004), ‘Does the organization of capital matter? Employers and active labor market policy at the national and firm level’, American Political Science Review 98(4): 593–611.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Molina, O. Rhodes, M. (2002), ‘Corporatism: the past, present, and future of a concept’, Annual Review of Political Science 5: 305–331.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nelson, M. (2009), ‘An application of the estimated dependent variable approach: trade union members’ support for active labor market policies and insider–outsider politics’, International Journal of Public Opinion 21(2): 224–234.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (1994), The OECD Jobs Study: Facts, Analysis, Strategies, Paris: OECD.Google Scholar
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2003), Employment Outlook: Towards More and Better Jobs, Paris: OECD.Google Scholar
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2006), Boosting Jobs and Incomes: Policy Lessons from Reassessing the OECD Jobs Strategy, Paris: OECD.Google Scholar
Ragin, C.C. (1987), The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies, Berkeley: University of California Press.Google Scholar
Ragin, C.C. (2000), Fuzzy Set Social Science, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Ragin, C.C. (2006), User’s Guide to Fuzzy Set/Qualitative Comparative Analysis 2.0, Tucson, Arizona: Department of Sociology, University of Arizona.Google Scholar
Ragin, C.C. (2008), Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rueda, D. (2005), ‘Insider-outsider politics in industrialized democracies: the challenge to social democratic parties, American Political Science Review 99(1): 61–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rueda, D. (2006), ‘Social democracy and active labour market policies: insiders, outsiders and the politics of employment promotion’, British Journal of Political Science 36(3): 385–406.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rueda, D. (2007), Social Democracy Inside Out: Partisanship and Labor Market Policy in Advanced Industrialized Democracies, Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scharpf, F.W. (1991 [1987]), Crisis and Choice in European Social Democracy, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Shalev, M. (2007), ‘Limits and alternatives to multiple regression in comparative research’, Comparative Social Research 24: 261–308.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Swank, D. Martin, C.J. (2001), ‘Employers and the welfare state: the political economic organization of firms and social policy in contemporary capitalist democracies’, Comparative Political Studies 34(8): 889–923.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Traxler, T. (2004), ‘The metamorphoses of corporatism: from classical to lean patterns’, European Journal of Political Research 43(4): 571–598.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vis, B. (2009a), ‘Governments and unpopular social policy reform: biting the bullet or steering clear?’, European Journal of Political Research 48(1): 31–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vis, B. (2009b), ‘The importance of socioeconomic and political losses and gains in welfare state reform’, Journal of European Social Policy 19(5): 395–407.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Vis, B. (2010), The Politics of Risk Taking: Welfare State Reform in Advanced Democracies, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Woldendorp, J., Keman, H. Budge, I. (2000), Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945–1998): Composition, Duration, Personnel, Dordrecht, Boston, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Supplementary material: File

Vis Supplementary Material

Vis Supplementary Appendix

Download Vis Supplementary Material(File)
File 203.8 KB