Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-hc48f Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-25T04:15:20.641Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The partisanship of systemic retrenchment: tax policy and welfare reform in Denmark 1975–2008

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 November 2012

Michael B. Klitgaard
Affiliation:
Professor, Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark
Christian Elmelund-Præstekær*
Affiliation:
Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern Denmark, Odense, Denmark
*

Abstract

We hypothesize that decisions to constrain government revenue may constitute an attractive strategy, especially to right-wing governments, when pursuing a preference for welfare state retrenchment. Whereas programmatic retrenchment in social policy programs imposes concentrated losses in return for diffuse gains, the distributive profile of systemic retrenchment via tax cuts might entail concentrated benefits for specified groups financed by diffuse losses for larger groups in a distant future. Consequently, the electorate may accept or even desire tax cuts and associated initiatives to curb government income relative to retrenchment measures of services and benefits. Our empirical analysis supports such theoretical propositions. In an extensive comparative analysis of all tax laws adopted by four Danish governments, we find clear partisan differences. In an in-depth study of the tax policy of the latest right-wing government, we moreover empirically support the causality of the argument as the government did in fact try to curb specific taxes in order to constrain the spending side of the welfare state in an indirect manner.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © European Consortium for Political Research 2012 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Allan, J.P. Scruggs, L. (2004), ‘Political partisanship and welfare state reform in advanced industrial countries’, American Journal of Political Science 48(3): 496512.Google Scholar
Andersen, J.G. (2003), Over-Danmark og Under-Danmark. Ulighed, Velfærdsstat og Politisk Medborgerskab, Aarhus: Aarhus Universitetsforlag.Google Scholar
Aylott, N. (1999), ‘Paradoxes and opportunism: the Danish election of march 1998’, Government and Opposition 34(1): 5977.Google Scholar
Beramendi, P. Rueda, D. (2007), ‘Social democracy constrained: indirect taxation in industrialized democracies’, British Journal of Political Science 37(4): 619641.Google Scholar
Blomqvist, P. Green-Pedersen, C. (2004), ‘Defeat at home? Issue-ownership and social democratic support in Scandinavia’, Government and Opposition 39(4): 587613.Google Scholar
Bonoli, G. Palier, B. (2001), ‘How do welfare states change? Institutions and their impact on the politics of welfare state reform in western Europe’, in S. Leibried (ed.), Welfare State Futures, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 5776.Google Scholar
Brennan, G. Buchanan, J.M. (1980), The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Buchanan, J.M. Wagner, R.E. (1977), Democracy in Deficit: The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes, New York: Academic Press.Google Scholar
Cameron, D. (1978), ‘The expansion of the public economy: a comparative analysis’, American Political Science Review 72(4): 12431261.Google Scholar
Citrin, J. (1979), ‘Do people want something for nothing: public opinion on taxes and government spending’, National Tax Journal 32(2): 113130.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Cusack, T.R. Beramendi, P. (2006), ‘Taxing work’, European Journal of Political Research 45(1): 4373.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Elmelund-Præstekær, C. Klitgaard, M.B. (2012), ‘Policy or institution? The political choice of retrenchment strategy’, Journal of European Public Policy 19(7): 10891107.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Esping-Andersen, G. (1999), Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Hacker, J.S. Pierson, P. (2010), ‘Winner-take-all politics: public policy, political organization, and the precipitous rise of top incomes in the United States’, Politics & Society 38(2): 152204.Google Scholar
Huber, E. Stephens, J.D. (2001), Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Politics in Global Markets, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.Google Scholar
Häusermann, S. (2010), ‘Solidarity with whom? Why organised labour is losing ground in continental pension politics’, European Journal of Political Research 49(2): 223256.Google Scholar
Jensen, C. (2012), ‘Labor market- versus life course-related social policies. Understanding cross-program differences’, Journal of European Public Policy 19(2): 275291.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Keeler, J.T.S. (1993), ‘Opening the window for reform’, Comparative Political Studies 25(4): 433486.Google Scholar
Klitgaard, M.B. (2008), ‘School vouchers and the new politics of the welfare state’, Governance 21(4): 479498.Google Scholar
Klitgaard, M.B. Elmelund-Præstekær, C. (2012), ‘Partisan effects on welfare state retrenchment: empirical evidence from a measurement of government intentions’, Social Policy and Administration , doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9515.2012.00850.x.Google Scholar
Korpi, W. Palme, J. (2003), ‘New politics and class politics in the context of austerity and globalization: welfare state regress in 18 countries, 1975–95’, American Political Science Review 97(3): 425446.Google Scholar
Kwon, H.Y. Pontusson, J. (2010), ‘Globalization, labor power and partisan politics revisited’, Socio-Economic Review 8(2): 251281.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mouritzen, P.E. Winter, S. (2001), ‘Why people want something for nothing: the role of assymmetrical illusions’, European Journal of Political Research 39(1): 109143.Google Scholar
Persson, T. Svensson, L.E.O. (1989), ‘Why a stubborn conservative would run a deficit: policy with time-inconsistent preferences’, The Quarterly Journal of Economics 104(2): 325345.Google Scholar
Pierson, P. (1994), Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Pierson, P. (1996), ‘The new politics of the welfare state’, World Politics 48(2): 143179.Google Scholar
Pierson, P. (2001a), ‘Post-industrial pressures on the mature welfare states’, in P. Pierson (ed.), The New Politics of the Welfare State, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 80104.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pierson, P. (ed.) (2001b), The New Politics of the Welfare State, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Regeringen (2001), Vækst, velfærd – fornyelse, København: VK-Regeringen.Google Scholar
Regeringen (2003), Vækst, velfærd – fornyelse ii, København: VK-Regeringen.Google Scholar
Regeringen (2005), Nye mål, København: VK-Regeringen II.Google Scholar
Regeringen (2007a), Lavere skat på arbejde. Aftale mellem regeringen og dansk folkeparti, København: Regeringen.Google Scholar
Regeringen (2007b), Mulighedernes samfund, København: VK-Regeringen III.Google Scholar
Regeringen (2009), Forårspakke 2.0 – vækst, klima, lavere skat, København: Regeringen.Google Scholar
Romer, C.D. Romer, D.H. (2009), ‘Do tax cuts starve the beast? The effect of tax changes on government spending’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity (Spring): 139200. Available on http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~dromer/papers/Romer_BPEA_Reprint.pdf Google Scholar
Skatteministeriet (2002), Skat – August 2002, København: Skatteministeriet.Google Scholar
Steinmo, S. (1993), Taxation and Democracy: Swedish, British and American Approaches to Financing the Modern State, New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Steinmo, S. (2002), ‘Taxation and globalization: challenges to the Swedish welfare state’, Comparative Political Studies 35(7): 839862.Google Scholar
Swank, D. (2006), ‘Tax policy in an era of internationalization: an assessment of a conditional diffusion model of the spread of neoliberalism’, International Organization 60(4): 847882.Google Scholar
Swank, D. Steinmo, S. (2002), ‘The new political economy of taxation in advanced capitalist democracies’, American Journal of Political Science 46(3): 642655.Google Scholar
Vis, B. (2010), Politics of Risk-taking: Welfare State Reform in Advanced Democracies, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.Google Scholar
Vis, B. van Kersbergen, K. (2007), ‘Why and how do political actors pursue risky reforms?’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 19(2): 153172.CrossRefGoogle Scholar