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Rationality and social norms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 July 2009

Jon Elster
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Extract

One of the most persisting cleavages in the social sciences is the opposition between two lines of thought conveniently associated with Adam Smith and Émile Durkheim, between homo economicus and homo sociologicus. Of these, the former is supposed to be guided by instrumental rationality, while the behavior of the latter is dictated by social norms. The former is ‘pulled’ by the prospect of future rewards, whereas the latter is ‘pushed’ from behind by quasi-inertial forces (Gambetta 1987). The former adapts to changing circumstances, always on the lookout for improvements. The latter is insensitive to circumstances, adhering to the prescribed behavior even if new and apparently better options become available. The former is easily caricatured as a self-contained, asocial atom, and the latter as the mindless plaything of social forces. In this paper I characterize this contrast more fully, and discuss attempts to reduce norm-oriented action to some type of optimizing behavior.

Type
The puzzling scope of rationality
Information
European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , May 1991 , pp. 109 - 129
Copyright
Copyright © Archives Européenes de Sociology 1991

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