Directing Disengagement: Movement Centralization, Coordination, and Credibility in the Irish and Basque Peace Processes

Philippe Duhart

doi:10.1017/S0003975616000023

Directing Disengagement

Movement Centralization, Coordination, and Credibility in the Irish and Basque Peace Processes

Published online by Cambridge University Press: 07 April 2016

Philippe Duhart

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Philippe Duhart*: Affiliation:
University of California, Los Angeles [[email protected]].

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Abstract

This article examines the relationship between the structure of politico-military movements and effective insurgent engagement in peace processes. Drawing on the experiences of Irish republicans and Basque separatists, I argue that centralized movement structures in which politicos wield influence over armed groups allow for effective coordination between movement wings in peace efforts while providing political leaders with credibility as interlocutors. In the Irish case, centralization enabled Sinn Fein leaders to ensure Provisional ira commitment to peace and to contain schism within the republican movement throughout the peace process. In the Basque case, movement decentralization created persistent coordination problems between wings during peace efforts, while eta’s unilateral reneging prevented political allies from establishing credibility as peacemakers. These cases show that while movement leaders untainted by direct association with armed groups may be more politically palatable than those with ties to “terrorists”, tainted leaders may make more credible partners for peace.

Résumé

Cet article étudie la relation entre la structure des mouvements militaro-politiques et l’engagement des insurgés dans les processus de paix. À partir des expériences des républicains irlandais et des séparatistes basques, je soutiens que les mouvements disposant d’une structure centralisée dans laquelle les politiciens exercent une influence sur les groupes armés permettent une coordination efficace entre les ailes du mouvement dans l’effort de paix tout en donnant aux leaders politiques une crédibilité en tant qu’interlocuteurs. Dans le cas de l’Irlande, la centralisation a permis aux dirigeants du Sinn Fein de garantir l’engagement de l’IRA Provisoire pour la paix et de contenir le risque de schisme à l’intérieur du mouvement républicain tout au long du processus de paix. Dans le cas basque, la décentralisation du mouvement a créé des problèmes de coordination persistants entre ses différentes ailes durant les efforts de paix, tandis que le reniement unilatéral de l’ETA a empêché ses alliés politiques d’établir leur crédibilité en tant que pacificateurs. Ces cas montrent que si les dirigeants de mouvement non entachés par une association directe avec des groupes armés peuvent être politiquement plus acceptables que ceux ayant des liens avec des « terroristes », les dirigeants entachés par ces liens peuvent faire des partenaires plus crédibles pour la paix.

Zusammenfassung

Dieser Aufsatz untersucht die Beziehung zwischen der Struktur der militär-politischen Bewegungen und der Beteiligung der Aufständischen an Friedensprozessen. Ausgehend von den Erfahrungen der irischen Republikanern und den baskischen Separatisten, behaupte ich, dass zentralstrukturierte Bewegungen, in denen Politiker bewaffnete Gruppen beeinflussen, eine effektive Koordination der verschiedenen Flügel einer Bewegung in der Friedensarbeit ermöglichen und gleichzeitig die politischen Führer zu glaubwürdigen Ansprechpartnern werden lassen. Im Fall Irlands konnte die Parteiführung des Sinn Fein dank der Zentralisierung die Beteiligung der provisorischen IRA am Friedensprozess garantieren und das Risiko der inneren Spaltung der republikanischen Bewegung während der Friedensbestrebungen in Grenzen halten. Im baskischen Fall hat die Dezentralisierung der Bewegung permanente Koordinationsprobleme zwischen den verschiedenen Flügeln während den Friedensbestrebungen geschaffen, wobei die unilaterale Verleugnung der ETA ihre Verbündeten darin gehindert hat, als glaubwürdige Friedensstifter aufzutreten. Diese Beispielfälle zeigen, dass wenn nicht mit bewaffneten Gruppen in Verbindung stehende Führer politisch eher akzeptiert werden können, als jene, die mit Terroristen verquickt sind, so stellen letztere glaubwürdigere Partner für den Frieden dar.

Keywords

ETA IRA Organizational structure Politico-military movement Peace process Sinn fein ETA IRA Structure organisationnelle Mouvement politico-militaire Processus de paix Sinn Fein ETA IRA Organisatorische Struktur Politisch-militärische Bewegung Friedensprozess Sinn Fein

Type: Structures of Violence
Information: European Journal of Sociology / Archives Européennes de Sociologie , Volume 57 , Issue 1 , April 2016 , pp. 31 - 63

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003975616000023 [Opens in a new window]
Copyright: Copyright © A.E.S. 2016

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