The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) relies on scientific evidence as a conclusive risk assessment criterion, which ignores the inherent limitations of science. This article highlights certain trade-restrictive effects of scientific evidence and comments on the Agreement’s aversions to precautionary measures and the consumer concern of the harmful effects of biotech products that may be necessary to protect public health and biosecurity in many WTO Member States. These measures and concerns have become pressing issues due to surging consumer awareness and vigilance concerning environmental protection and food safety. The Agreement is yet to overcome the weaknesses of its endorsed international standardising bodies, the problematic definition of scientific evidence and treatment of justification for scientific risk assessment methods and the implementation difficulties faced by most developing states. This article analyses these issues under the provisions of the Agreement and the interpretations of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in disputes involving SPS matters, which fall short of addressing scientific uncertainty surrounding biotech products and their associated risks.

In the World Trade Organization (WTO), the US approach to science-based risks and trade restrictions prevailed over that of the European Union (EU). The EU, dissatisfied with the margin of action available when “relevant scientific evidence is insufficient”, largely kept intact its internal practice on marketing and importing genetically modified (GM) crops and GM-containing products. The goal of this article is to ascertain whether these regulatory preferences of the US and the EU translate into their post-Biotech external trade efforts. US and EU preferential trade agreements are scanned for rules on trade in biotechnology goods or the use of precautionary elements in regulation. It transpires that neither bloc systematically tries (or manages) to bend trade agreements to accommodate its defensive or offensive trade interests in this field. Among the possible reasons for this apparent inertia are the US confidence in the WTO baseline and the EU preference for a “don’t ask, don’t tell” approach to its trade-restrictive policy in this area.

This paper proposes an approach to the debate on how to reconcile international trade and human rights, explaining the minimum content of the ordre public and morality clauses (OPMCs) as the recognition of international human rights law (IHRL) standards in trade law and intellectual property law. Within the context of a multicultural and globalised society, in which trade and economic interests are protected worldwide and morality seems to be a culture-based concept, the primary considerations of IHRL embedded in these pivot clauses serve as a universal defence for human beings and a safeguard to the coherence of the human-centred international system. In particular, this study argues that the OPMCs allow for the enforcement of three standards derived from human dignity in the wider spectrum of biotechnology and scientific research, even constituting legitimate limits to the economic exploitation of biotechnological inventions.

The international trade in biotech products boosts national economies and advances scientific as well as technology innovation. However, while trading these products increases the spread of benefits on a global scale, it also increases risks to human health and the environment (ie biosafety). This is because the effects of this technology on biosafety are still highly uncertain. Against this background, the judicial bodies under the World Trade Organization (WTO) find themselves in the middle of an intricate and polarised debate in which a proper judicial balance between free trade and biosafety becomes fundamental in order to determine whether requests for ensuring human and environmental health justify trade restrictions. This paper aims to highlight that the WTO is institutionally unready for balancing economic and non-economic values. In suggesting how to rationalise the judicial balance between the competing interests in the context of biotechnology, this paper demonstrates that the judicial adoption of a well-structured proportionality analysis can turn the current balance by chance into a balance by structure.

This paper examines, in the light of the COVID-19 crisis, the room for judicial oversight of health crisis measures based on the public’s expectations of how governments should act in the interplay with experts. The paper explains how trust theory and procedural rationality review help to address concerns related to legitimacy and expertise. The paper argues that courts should distinguish between two stages. In the initial stage, fear as a driver for government support based on expertise justifies that the proportionality test is limited to the question of whether measures were based on virologist expert advice. In the next stage, people expect the government to take expert-informed decisions, but also require that the government takes into account societal needs. Procedural rationality review in this stage demands that courts examine whether the decision was based on an informed balance of rights and interests.

This article offers a critical discussion of the “Report on Liability for Artificial Intelligence and Other Emerging Digital Technologies” released by the Expert Group on Liability and New Technologies. In particular, the authors consider: the excessive diversity of applications encompassed through the notion of “artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies”; the distinction between high- and low-risk applications as a potential source of legal uncertainty; the primary reliance on evidentiary rules over substantive ones; the problematic role attributed to safety rules; the unclear relationship between the Product Liability Directive and other ad hoc liability regimes; the radical exclusion of electronic personhood as a way of addressing liability issues; and the limited contextualisation of compulsory insurance and no-compensation funds.

Since 1974, the UK has followed a risk-based approach to safety that, in the event of an incident, is enforced through the courts. The legislation is intentionally non-prescriptive and thus requires duty holders and the courts to decide what control measures were reasonable in the circumstances from ex ante and ex post positions. This has proved challenging for all parties involved. This paper describes a series of cases that have shed light on the thought processes of the courts. It appears that there is some variability in decision-making that can be attributed to several factors, including understanding of the word “risk”, the acceptability of residual risk and the validity of historical data as a means of measuring risk. In the aftermath of incidents, there is a real danger that psychological factors may intervene when the prior risk is being assessed for sentencing purposes. It is argued that while the risk-based model continues to enjoy widespread support in the UK and is not challenged, its implementation could be much eased by attention to details. This would serve to simplify courtroom debates, support those practising risk-based regulation and enable risks to be better prioritised.

Based on a mix of conceptual insights and findings from cases, this paper discusses three ways in which the effectiveness of regulation in the areas of competition, data and consumer protection can be improved by tailoring substantive protections and enforcement mechanisms to the extent of market power held by firms. First, it is analysed how market power can be integrated into the substantive scope of protection of data protection and consumer law, drawing inspiration from competition law’s special responsibility for dominant firms. Second, it is illustrated how more asymmetric and smarter enforcement of existing data protection rules against firms possessing market power can strengthen the protection of data subjects and stimulate competition based on lessons from priority-setting and cooperation by consumer authorities. Third, it is explored how competition law’s special responsibility for dominant firms can be further strengthened in analogy with the principle of accountability in data protection law. Similarly, it is discussed how positive duties to ensure fair outcomes for consumers are developed in consumer law. The analysis offers lessons for improving the ability of the three regimes to protect consumers by imposing greater responsibility on firms with greater market power and thus posing greater risks for consumer harm.

For some time, pressure was placed on the European Food Safety Authority concerning the manner in which it conducted risk assessments in relation to food safety. This pressure culminated in the introduction of Regulation (EU) No. 2019/1381 as the upshot to the European Citizens’ Initiative on glyphosate. Concerns were expressed in the initiative regarding the transparency of the scientific studies used to evaluate pesticides, and following a Fitness Check conducted by the European Commission. Effectively, the new Regulation seeks to impose an obligation on EFSA to publish industry studies at the beginning of the risk assessment process. However, the mandatory nature of this obligation raises a number of concerns as to whether the urge to increase the transparency of the work of the EU authorities is more important than keeping the research confidential, two converse ideals in the realm of European law and effective processes. The present article submits that this codified focus on the risk assessment process and its accessibility for European citizens is a new frontier for transparency within the EU risk assessment processes. Yet while the changes pioneered by this framework are laudable, the Regulation is not without its qualifications.

This report examines what has come to be known as “vaccine nationalism” through the lens of the early experience with the COVID-19 vaccination process. After explaining the meaning of the term, this report investigates how this phenomenon has manifested during the COVID-19 pandemic, identifying its epidemiological, economical, ethical and legal aspects. It also looks at the different international initiatives that have been adopted to deal with it, concentrating in this context on the COVAX project. The report concludes that the success of these initiatives has been limited. It also observes that COVID-19 vaccine nationalism appears to be a phenomenon that is characteristic of the high-income Western countries, while in aspiring non-Western powers the vaccine crisis is primarily seen as a way to advance their geopolitical goals.

Despite robust evidence on the benefits of gum mastication as compared to its risks, places such as Singapore still outlaw chewing gum outside of medicinal purposes. Chewing gum has therapeutic and cognitive benefits such as reduced stress and increased attention, and its associated costs such as littering are disproportionately upheld and still prosecuted against in Singapore. This is a clear example of a policy implemented based on perception rather than cost–benefit analysis. Policies, even as minor as those related to gum mastication, must be entrenched in evidence, and any accompanying costs (eg littering) can and should be deterred through evidence-based communication efforts.