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Sharing Economy and Regulatory Strategies towards Legal Change

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Gabriel Doménech-Pascual
Gabriel Doménech-Pascual*
Affiliation:
University of Valencia
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Abstract

The rise of the sharing economy is transforming the way we produce and consume goods and services. This transformation requires a revision of current legal rules concerning sectors where the sharing economy is emerging. Taking the regulation of the taxi industry as a main example, this article analyses why those rules ought to be reviewed, the obstacles law makers have to face in order to perform such a task, and the regulatory strategies they could use for that purpose. The paper considers a variety of regulatory approaches including regulatory impact assessment, legal variation, the coexistence of different legal regimes, experimental legislation and compensation.

Type
Special Issue on the Risks and Opportunities of the Sharing Economy
Information
European Journal of Risk Regulation , Volume 7 , Issue 4 , December 2016 , pp. 717 - 727
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016

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References

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13- This is a controversial issue under European Union law. On 7 August 2015, the Commercial Court No 3 of Barcelona made a preliminary reference to the Court of Justice of the European Union with that regard (case C-434/15).

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17- Ibid.

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27- Ibid, at 479.

28- Ibid, at 480.

29- Ibid, at 481.

30- See, for instance, European Commission, “A European Agenda for the Collaborative Economy”, supra, note 19, at 5.

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33- See, for instance, Ranchordás, Sofia, “Sunset Clauses and Experimental Regulations: Blessing or Curse for Legal Certainty?” (2015) 36(1) Statute Law Review 33 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.; Doménech-Pascual, Gabriel, “Los Experimentos Jurídicos” (2004) 164 Revista de Administración Pública 145 Google Scholar.

34- See also Gubler, Zachary J., “Experimental Rules” (2014) 55 Boston College Law Review 136 et seq Google Scholar.

35- See Abramowicz, Michael, Ayres, Ian and Listokin, Yair, “Randomizing Law” (2011) 159 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 929 Google Scholar.

36- Ibid, at 976.

37- Gaunt, Clive, “Taxicab Deregulation in New Zealand” (1996) 30(1) Journal of Transport Economics and Policy 103 Google Scholar.

38- See Statutory Instrument No 3 of 2000, amending the Road Traffic (Public Service Vehicles) Regulations.

39- See Humphrey and Others v. the Minister for the Environment and Local Government and Others Judgment delivered by Justice Murphy J. on 13 October 2000.

40- See Gorman v. Minister for the Environment and Local Government judgment delivered by Justice Carney on 23 May 2001.

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42- For more details, see Point to Point Transport (Taxis and Hire Vehicles) Act 2016 No 34 (specially Schedule 3 “Adjustment assistance for taxi and passenger hire vehicle industries” and Schedule 4 “Passenger service levy”) and Point to Point Transport (Taxis and Hire Vehicles) Regulation 2016.

43- See Johnston, Alan, “Taxi Industry Reform: Should There Be Compensation” (2000) 7(2) Agenda. Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform 179 Google Scholar.

44- As Deighton-Smith, Rex, “Background Note”, in OECD Taxi Services: Competition and Regulation (2007), pp. 39 Google Scholar, notes, “governments would expect to encounter substantial political difficulties in justifying distributing these sums [of money] to small interest groups in order to compensate them for the removal of their right to extract monopoly rents from consumers”.

45- See Alan Johnston, “Taxi Industry Reform”, supra, note 43, at 180.

46- See Fishel, William A. and Shapiro, Perry, “A Constitutional Choice Model of Compensation for Takings” (1989) 9 International Review of Law and Economics 119 Google Scholar; Posner, Richard A., Economic Analysis of Law (Aspen Publishers 2007) 58 and 59Google Scholar; Bell, Abraham and Parchomovsky, Gideon, “The Hidden Function of Takings Compensation” (2010) 96 Virginia Law Review 1692 Google Scholar.

47- As Rose-Ackerman, Susan and Rossi, Jim, “Disentangling Deregulatory Takings” (2000) 86 Virginia Law Review at 1465 Google Scholar, note, “[t]he Takings Clause should not be used to protect those who have had a chance to influence policy or who are in a position to anticipate future changes in policy and take them into account in their investment decisions”.

48- Alan Johnston, “Taxi Industry Reform”, supra, note 43, at 179.