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“Every death matters?”: Combat casualties, role conception, and civilian control

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 November 2021

Anit Mukherjee Open the ORCID record for Anit Mukherjee [Opens in a new window]
Anit Mukherjee*
Affiliation:
S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore
*
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

How do combat missions, defined as an armed confrontation that causes casualties, shape civil-military relations and military’s role conception? This article argues that militaries that incur combat casualties gain a stronger hand in the civil-military equilibrium. This is because casualties affect domestic political opinion and give prominence to the views expressed by military officials. Civilians are then more deferential to professional military advice. In turn, the military obtains considerable operational freedom, and can pick and choose missions which they find desirable. Second, the military’s role conception – an important determinant of military missions, is shaped most prominently by its combat experience. Militaries sustaining casualties obtain leverage vis-à-vis civilians and based on their institutional preference, they either prioritise or avoid non-traditional missions. While making these arguments, this article examines combat casualties, role conception, and civilian control in India. These concepts as a whole and, the Indian case study especially are surprisingly understudied considering it is among the few non-Western democracies with firm civilian control, a record of overseas intervention operations and a military with varying roles and missions. Analysing India’s experience therefore adds to the literature and illuminates the mechanism through which casualties affect civil-military relations.

Keywords

Civil-Military RelationsCivilian ControlCasualty SensitivityRole ConceptionIndia
Type
Special Issue Article
Information
European Journal of International Security , Volume 7 , Special Issue 1: Military Organizations in a Changing World: How New Operational Experiences Shape Civil-Military Relations , February 2022 , pp. 124 - 141
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the British International Studies Association

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92 Manas Dasgupta, ‘IAF chief not for using air power against Naxals’, The Hindu (8 April 2010), available at: {https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/IAF-chief-not-for-using-air-power-=against-Naxals/article16364778.ece} and Press Trust of India, ‘I opposed Army deployment in anti-naxal operations: Gen VK Singh’, Economic Times (8 November 2013), available at: {https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/i-opposed-army-deployment-in-anti-naxal-operations-gen-vk-singh/articleshow/25451086.cms} In India the executive has powers to deploy the military for internal security duties and does not require parliamentary approval. However, due to the federal structure, it either needs to dismiss or coopt the state government.

93 For details, see Ministry of Defence, Annual Report: 2017–18 (New Delhi: Government of India, 2018), p. 154.

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99 Peter White, ‘Generals in the Cabinet: Military participation in government and international conflict initiation’, International Studies Quarterly (February 2021), p. 10, available at: {https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqab012}.