The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, more commonly known as the Fiscal Compact, and the Treaty establishing the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) are closely linked in several ways. Both treaties are formally placed outside the European Union framework, but substantively govern Union matters. Together they are designed to combat the sovereign debt crisis which has been ravaging the European Union for years now. The Fiscal Compact does so by enhancing and sharpening budgetary discipline in the Eurozone states, the ESM Treaty by offering assistance to Eurozone states in financial distress. To receive financial aid from the ESM, states not only need to have ratified the Fiscal Compact, but also to have implemented a balanced budget rule in their national law in the way the Compact demands. Apart from combating the crisis, the Treaties also bring reforms to the Eurozone; they express the wish of the signatory parties to share their destinies in new ways.

Of the three branches of government traditionally distinguished since Montesquieu, two have received ample scholarly attention in their relation with the European Union. A plethora of books and articles have been written on the role and position of national courts and national parliaments in Europe. As to the former, the interaction of national courts with the Court of Justice of the European Union is still massively researched. As to the latter, it has been thoroughly analysed how national parliaments were sidelined from the start of the integration process, only to regain lost ground later. In particular, attempts to include the national parliaments in EU decision-making, via the renewed Subsidiarity Protocol among other ways, have attracted numerous research activities.

In between the writing of this editorial and the publication of this issue of EuConst, the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union, in everyday parlance the ‘Fiscal Compact’, will have been signed by the representatives of the governments of the contracting parties — the member states of the European Union minus the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic. The Fiscal Compact is intended to foster budgetary discipline, to strengthen the coordination of economic policies and to improve the governance of the euro area.

European Court of Human Rights – Suggestions for reducing case backlog and national criticism of the Court – Alternative to incremental case law and reasoning by analogy – Greater deference to national courts where individual interests, rather than fundamental rights are at stake – Guidelines to find objective criteria for the definition of fundamental rights – Sharper delineation of Convention rights – Procedural review preceding substantive review

Constitutional limits to the discretion of the legislature in forming the electoral system — Political equality — Equal suffrage — Equal opportunities for political parties — Free expression of popular will — Functionality of the parliament — Concrete normative standards for assessing the constitutionality of an electoral system — Conception of parliamentary democracy emphasising representation of political minorities and protection from ‘tyranny of the majority’

Scope of application of Charter – What does ‘implementing Union law’ mean? – Application of v. derogation from EU law – Asylum cases, N.S. – Familiapress, Schmidberger, Viking – Implementing to include derogation – Annibaldi and Dereci – Interpretation of the Charter – ‘Provided for by law’ – The ‘essence’ of a right or freedom – Legitimate objectives and proportionality – Rights both in EU Treaties and in Charter: citizenship – Charter and ECHR – Constitutional Traditions, level of protection and deference – Article 53 not according to Solange, but like Omega and Sayn-Wittgenstein – Principles and Rights

Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance – Economic governance – Stability Pact – The European Council – National constitutional law.

European Court of Human Rights — Separation of powers — Stafford/Kleyn and A/Kart strands of case-law — Problematic aspects of both strands — Limitations and institutional deficiencies of the Court in this area — Constitutionalisation of and shift in the role of the Court

Article 3 ECHR and expulsion, extradition – Indirect and potential violations – Interim measures – Lowering of threshold – Transformation from civil to social right – Asylum seekers special vulnerable group

Eurozone sovereign debt crisis – Europe's ‘Alexander Hamilton Moment’ – American sovereign debt crisis of 1780s – Articles of Confederation – U.S. Constitution – Assumption of states' debt – Constitutional transformation key factor in enabling Alexander Hamilton's debt restructuring

European External Action Service – Treaty of Lisbon – High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy – combination with role of Vice President of the European Commission responsible for external action – Institutional balance between the Commission and the Council – Curtailment in practice of High Representative's ‘Vice Presidential’ powers – Hybrid approach toward role of EEAS: both intergovernmental and communitarian

Monarchies in Europe — Monarchs as embodiments of sovereignty — Implications for monarchy of the EU as a limitation of sovereignty — Effects of Union law on the prerogatives of monarchs — Monarchs as heads of state in the Union

Allegro – Trademark protection – Freedom of speech vs. intellectual property – Polish Constitution – European Convention on Human Rights – Balancing of competing values – Constitutionally permissible limits on freedom of expression – Comparison with case-law of United States Supreme Court – ‘Categorical’ approach vs. ‘balancing’ approach

Relation between national constitutions and EU law – Constitutional conflict – Role of national institutions in avoiding constitutional conflict – A need for a holistic approach in European constitutionalism – Constitutional courts put forward constitutional requirements next to constitutional reservations – The need to bring constitutions in line with EU law before accession – The role of parliaments and governments in avoiding conflict when implementing EU law – Role of national institutions in decision-making at EU level