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The Rationale of Economics and Law in the Aftermath of the Crisis: A Lesson from Michel Foucault
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 December 2016
Abstract
Economic and financial crisis – Institutional response and constitutional changes in the area of economic governance – Relationship between the European Union and the member states – Interpretation – Two concepts elaborated by Michel Foucault – ‘Pastorship’ and ‘Discipline’ – The deep sense of the new techniques of government in this area – The role of the Court of Justice – The position of national judges.
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Footnotes
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Professor of Italian and European Administrative Law, University of Salerno, Italy. A longer version of this article was published in Italian under the title ‘“Pastorato” e “disciplinamento” nella governance economica europea’ 3 Diritto pubblico (2015). Sincere thanks go to Adalgiso Amendola, Laura Bazzicalupo, Raffaele Bifulco, Paola Chirulli, Maria Di Benedetto, Antonella Meniconi and to the Editors of EuConst for their comments on a previous version of this paper. Many thanks also go to Rino Montuori of the University of Salerno for his precious help in finding the bibliographic material. The usual disclaimer applies.
References
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25 Following the judgment of the ECJ 13 July 2004, Case C-27/04, Commission v Council, the Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure was made more flexible: see Council Regulation (EC) No 1055/2005 of 27 June 2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies. See the summary by Craig, supra n. 23, at p. 200.
26 See Tuori and Tuori, supra n. 1, chs 2 and 7; for a different perspective see K.A. Armstrong, ‘Differentiated Economic Governance and the Reshaping of Dominium-Law’, in M. Adams et al. (eds.), The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints (Hart Publishing 2014) p. 65-83.
27 See Tuori and Tuori, supra n. 1, at p. 101-104 and 162-168.
28 Craig, P., ‘The Financial Crisis, the EU Institutional Order and Constitutional Responsibility’, in F. Fabbrini, et al. (eds.), What Form of Government for the European Union and the Eurozone? (Hart Publishing 2015) p. 27-31 Google Scholar; Dawson, M., ‘The Legal and Political Accountability Structure of “Post-Crisis” EU Economic Governance’, 53 JCMS (2015) p. 976-993 Google Scholar; Lenaerts, K., ‘EMU and the EU’s constitutional framework’, 39 EL Rev (2014) p. 753-769 Google Scholar; K. Tuori, The European Financial Crisis – Constitutional Aspects and Implications, EUI Working Paper LAW 2012/28, p. 10 ff. See also the Communication from the Commission, ‘Economic governance review. Report on the application of Regulations (EU) No 1173/2011, 1174/2011, 1175/2011, 1176/2011, 1177/2011, 472/2013 and 473/2013’, COM(2014) 905 final.
29 E.g. Tuori and Tuori, supra n. 1, p. 162-168.
30 Regulation (EU) No 473/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on common provisions for monitoring and assessing draft budgetary plans and ensuring the correction of excessive deficit of the Member States in the euro area, Council Regulation (EC) No 1466/97 of 7 July 1997 on the strengthening of the surveillance of budgetary positions and the surveillance and coordination of economic policies (consolidated version) and Council Regulation (EC) No 1467/97 of 7 July 1997 on speeding up and clarifying the implementation of the excessive deficit procedure (consolidated version).
31 Regulation (EU) No 1176/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the prevention and correction of macroeconomic imbalances.
32 Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability.
33 See for example Art. 6, Regulation No. 1466/97 and Art. 3 ff, Regulation No. 1467/97.
34 Regulation (EU) No. 1173/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the effective enforcement of budgetary surveillance in the euro area.
35 To cite two examples: in the report for 2015 on the last in-depth review on the prevention and correction of Italian macroeconomic imbalances, the Commission outlines the strengths and weaknesses of the national education system: Commission, ‘Macroeconomic Imbalances. Country Report – Italy 2015’, p. 61 ff (available at <ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2015/pdf/ocp219_en.pdf>, visited 1 October 2016). In addition, the Council recommendations on the 2015 Italian national reform programme adopted on the 15 June 2015 (9246/15) inviting the Italian Republic to ‘Adopt the planned national strategic plan for ports and logistics’ (para. 2), and ‘adopt and implement the pending laws aimed at improving the institutional framework and modernising the public administration. Revise the statute of limitations by mid-2015. Ensure that the reforms adopted to improve the efficiency of civil justice help reduce the length of proceedings’ (para. 3), ‘implement the simplification agenda for 2015-2017 to ease the administrative and regulatory burden’ (para. 6). In general see Somek, A., ‘Delegation and Authority: Authoritarian Liberalism Today’, 21 ELJ (2015) p. 340 CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 342-3.
36 Amtenbrink, F. and de Haan, J., ‘Economic governance in the European Union: Fiscal policy discipline versus flexibility’, 40 CMLR (2003) p. 1075 at pp. 1081-1085 Google Scholar.
37 Communication from the Commission, supra n. 28, at p. 5-7.
38 As is well known on the basis of this rule some Commission proposals can be rejected by the Council only with a certain majority: see Art. 4(2), (3) and (6), Reg. No. 1173/11; Art. 6(2), Reg. No. 1466/97; Art. 10(4), Reg. No. 1176/11; Art. 3(3), Reg. No. 1174/11; Art. 14(1) and (4), Reg. No. 472/13; Art. 7 Fiscal Compact.
39 Craig, P., ‘Economic Governance and the Euro Crisis: Constitutional Architecture and Constitutional Implications’, in M Adams et al. (eds.), The Constitutionalization of European Budgetary Constraints (Hart Publishing 2014) p. 19 Google Scholar at p. 37.
40 M. Dawson, New Governance in the EU after the Euro Crisis: Retired or Re-born?, EUI WP, AEL 2015/01; Armstrong, supra n. 1, at p. 614, maintains that the specific recommendation in Art. 121(2) TFEU has an almost legislative nature, as the non-compliance of the State can trigger a complex path culminating ultimately in the application of sanctions. However, little is said about the legal effectiveness of such acts.
41 See Baraggia, A., ‘Conditionality Measures within the Euro Area Crisis: A Challenge to the Democratic Principle?’, 4 Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law (2015) p. 268 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Tuori and Tuori, supra n. 1, p. 89-101.
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47 For example see A.J. Menéndez, ‘The Existential Crisis of the European Union’, 14 German Law Journal (2013) p. 453 at p. 515-517 and Armstrong, supra n. 26, p. 65-83.
48 C. Joerges, Europe’s Economic Constitution in Crisis and the Emergence of a New Constitutional Constellation, ZenTra Working Paper in Transnational Studies No. 06/2012; more in general on this issue see the essays collected in P. Minkkinen et al. (eds.), The Contemporary Relevance of Carl Schmitt (Routledge 2015).
49 See 3 ELJ (2015) and specifically the contribution of Somek, supra n. 35.
50 Mezzadra, S., ‘Seizing Europe. Crisis management, constitutional transformations, constituent movements’, in O.G. Agustin and C. Idese (eds.), Post-crisis Perspectives. The Common and its Powers (Peter Lang Verlag 2013) p. 99-118 Google Scholar.
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52 For example see Oberndorfer, L., ‘A New Economic Governance through Secondary Legislation? Analysis and Constitutional Assessment: From New Constitutionalism, via Authoritarian Constitutionalism to Progressive Constitutionalism’, in N. Bruun et al. (eds.), The Economic and Financial Crisis and Collective Labour Law in Europe (Hart Publishing 2014) p. 25-54 Google Scholar; Merlingen, M., ‘Foucault and World Politics: Promises and Challenges of Extending Governmentality Theory to the European and Beyond’, 35 Millennium (2006) p. 181-196 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Haahr, supra n. 22, p. 209-230; Gill, S., ‘European Governance and New Constitutionalism: Economic and Monetary Union and Alternatives to Disciplinary Neoliberalism in Europe’, 3 New Political Economy (1988) p. 5-26 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
53 Foucault, M., Security, Territory, Population. Lectures at the Collège de France 1977–78 (Palgrave Macmillan 2007)Google Scholar chs. 6-8; M. Foucault, Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of ‘Political Reason’, The Tanner Lectures On Human Values 1979/1980, <tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/f/foucault81.pdf>, visited 1 October 2016.
54 Foucault 2007, supra n. 53, at p. 148.
55 See, for an overview, B. Golder, ‘Foucault and the Genealogy of Pastoral Power’, 10 Radical Philosophy Review (2007) p. 157-176.
56 It is useful to emphasise that comparing the States in economic difficulty to sheep seems somewhat better than comparing them to swine (P.I.I.G.S.).
57 Foucault 2007, supra n. 53, at p. 181.
58 Foucault 2007, supra n. 53, at p. 181. In more analytical terms see M. Foucault, On the Government of the Living. Lectures at the Collège de France 1979-80 (Palgrave Macmillan 2014) ch. 12.
59 Foucault 2014, supra n. 58, at p. 229.
60 Foucault 2007, supra n. 53, at p. 174.
61 An argument quite close to this one has already been proposed by Joseph Weiler when, referring to European constitutionalism, he tells a parable whose conclusion is, amongst other things, that an act of submission can often be simultaneously an act of emancipation and liberation and that virtue is a habit of the soul and habits are installed by practice: J.H.H. Weiler, Federalism and Constitutionalism: Europe’s Sonderweg, <jeanmonnetprogram.org/archive/papers/00/001001.html>, visited 1 October 2016.
62 Foucault 2007, supra n. 53, at p. 174.
63 Foucault 2007, supra n. 53, at p. 173.
64 Art 3 ff, Reg. No. 1176/11.
65 The classes are: 1) No imbalance; 2) Imbalances, which require monitoring and policy action; 3) Imbalances, which require monitoring and decisive policy action; 4) Imbalances, which require specific monitoring and decisive policy action; 5) Excessive imbalances, which require specific monitoring and decisive policy action; 6) Excessive imbalances, which require decisive policy action and the activation of the Excessive Imbalance Procedure: <ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/economic_governance/macroeconomic_imbalance_procedure/mip_reports/index_en.htm>, visited 1 October 2016.
66 Communication from the Commission, ‘Making the best use of flexibility within the existing rules of the stability and growth pact’, COM (2015) 12 final.
67 Foucault 2007, supra n. 53, at p. 178.
68 Foucault 2007, supra n. 53, at p. 172.
69 Foucault 2007, supra n. 53, at p. 169.
70 Foucault 2007, supra n. 53, at p. 172.
71 Arts 2-3, Reg. No. 1176/11.
72 Foucault talks about ‘sacrificial reversal’ to refer to the principle under which the pastor must be willing to die to save his flock (Foucault 2007, supra n. 53, at p. 170). In our context this principle is not applicable due to, amongst other things, the democratic structure of the State systems. This is a structure which calls for the political responsibility of those governing towards their citizens. On the lack of consideration of democracy in the thinking of Foucault, see B. De Giovanni, Alle origini della democrazia di massa. I filosofi e i giuristi [The origins of mass democracy. Philosophers and Lawyers] (Editoriale Scientifica 2013) p. 224 ff.
73 For example Snell, J., ‘The Trilemma of European Economic and Monetary Integration, and Its Consequences’, 22 ELJ (2016) p. 157 CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 164-167; Dawson, M. and de Witte, F., ‘Constitutional Balance in the EU after the Euro-Crisis’, 76 MLR (2013) p. 817 CrossRefGoogle Scholar at p. 824-828.
74 Foucault 2007, supra n. 53, at p. 275.
75 See in general Oberndorfer, supra n. 52, at p. 37-38.
76 Foucault, M., Discipline and Punish. The Birth of the Prison (Vintage Books 1995)Google Scholar especially the third part; Foucault, M., Psychiatric Power. Lectures at the Collège de France 1973-74 (Palgrave Macmillan 2006)Google Scholar, especially p. 39-92. For a different view see Gorski, P.S., The Disciplinary Revolution. Calvinism and the Rise of the State in Early Modern Europe (University of Chicago Press 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
77 Foucault 1995, supra n. 76, at p. 222.
78 E.g. Deleuze, G., Foucault (University of Minnesota Press 2006) p. 43 Google Scholar.
79 Foucault 1995, supra n. 76, at p. 180.
80 For an overview see Canguilhem, G., The Normal and the Pathological (Zone Books 1991)Google Scholar.
81 Machery, P., De Canguilhem à Foucault, la force des normes (La fabrique editions 2009)Google Scholar, especially ch 5; for a more general view, see D. Loschak, ‘Droit, normalité et normalisation’, in Le droit en procès (Presses Universitaires de France 1983) p. 51-77.
82 Foucault 2006, supra n. 76, at p. 46-47.
83 Documents available at <ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/intergovernmental_support/index_en.htm>, visited 1 October 2016.
84 Memorandum on the economic and financial policies of 3 May 2010 (attached to the first adjustment programme for Greece), <ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2010/pdf/ocp61_en.pdf>, § 8, visited 1 October 2016.
85 Ibid. § 13.
86 Art. 7(8), Reg. No. 472/13. Previously, with reference to Greece, see the documents available at the following address: <ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/assistance_eu_ms/greek_loan_facility/index_en.htm>, visited 1 October 2016.
87 Foucault 1995, supra n. 76, at p. 135-139 and p. 194; M. Foucault, Society Must Be Defended (Picador 2003) p. 23-43; M. Foucault, The History of Sexuality (Pantheon Books 1978) Part V.
88 A. von Bogdandy and M. Goldmann, Sovereign Debt Restructurings as Exercises of International Public Authority: Towards a Decentralized Sovereign Insolvency Law, <www.ssrn.com>, visited 1 October 2016.
89 Ioannidis, supra n. 42, at p. 91-94.
90 See e.g. the Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece. Occasional Paper of the Commission, March 2012, where it is stated that ‘the ownership of the programme and all executive responsibilities in the programme implementation remain with the Greek Government’ (p. 123). See also C. Kilpatrick, ‘Are the Bailouts Immune to EU Social Challenge Because They Are Not EU Law?’, 10 EuConst (2014) p. 393 at p. 396.
91 E.g. Ioannidis, supra n. 42, at p. 103.
92 IMF, Strengthening Country Ownership of Fund-Supported Programs, 2001, p. 6, <www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/strength/120501.pdf>, visited 1 October 2016.
93 See, amongst others, IMF, supra n. 92, at p. 7 ff, as well as J.M. Boughton, Who’s in Charge? Ownership and Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programmes, International Monetary Fund WP/03/191; Ioannidis, supra n. 42, at p. 89-102.
94 With reference to the IMF and the World Bank see Tan, supra n. 51, chs. 4 and 7.
95 See e.g. ECJ 27 November 2012, Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v Government of Ireland, Ireland, The Attorney General, para. 135.
96 In this sense, but following a different conceptuality see Ioannidis, supra n.42, at p. 96-98.
97 Snell, supra n. 73, at p. 164-169.
98 As already mentioned, however, the legal norms regarding the European semester allow the European Institutions to deal with almost every aspect of national policies. For all see Somek , supra n. 35, at p. 342-345; Dawson and de Witte, supra n. 73, at p. 824-828.
99 Reg. No. 1176/11, recital 1.
100 Supra n. 95, para. 135.
101 Reg. No. 1176/11.
102 Armstrong, supra n. 1, at p. 609-613.
103 C. Joerges and S. Giubboni, Europe’s Crisis-Law and the Welfare State – A Critique, WP CSDLE ‘Massimo D’Antona’ INT 109/2014, p. 12; Scharpf, F.W., ‘After the Crash: A Perspective on Multilevel European Democracy’, 21 ELJ (2015) p. 384 CrossRefGoogle Scholar, at p. 393-394.
104 L. Bazzicalupo, Il governo delle vite [The government of lives] (Bari 2006) ch. 2; H.M. Ingram and D.E. Mann, ‘Policy Failure: An Issue Deserving Analysis’, in H.M. Ingram and D.E. Mann (eds.), Why Policies Succeed or Fail (Sage Publications 1980) p. 11-32.
105 Bazzicalupo, supra n. 104, at p. 46. In different terms see Armstrong, supra n. 26, at p. 76-77, which talks of ‘governance by markets’.
106 Streeck, W., Buying Time. The Delayed Crisis of Democratic Capitalism (Verso 2014)Google Scholar ch. 2.
107 Supra n. 95, para. 135.
108 In general Armstrong, supra n. 19, at p. 179-214; M. Dawson, supra n. 40.
109 Foucault 2014, supra n. 57, at p. 230.
110 Foucault 2014, supra n. 57, at p. 178-179.
111 In this regard see the Opinion of A.G. Wathelet, ECJ 21 April 2016, Joined Cases C-105/15P to C-109/15P, Mallis and Malli v Commission and ECB, paras. 84-89. In literature see Kilpatrick, supra n. 90, at p. 407-416; Baraggia, supra n. 41, at p. 276-277.
112 Even more so for the formulation of conditionality: in general see Ioannidis, supra n. 42, at p. 94-96.
113 L. Bazzicalupo, ‘Le mobili linee di confine nella normatività sociale e la indeterminatezza delle procedure’ [The blurred borderlines of social normativity and the indeterminate nature of procedures], in A. Tucci (ed) Disaggregazioni. Forme e spazi di governance [Disaggregations. Forms and spaces of governance] (Mimesis 2013) p. 29-46.
114 Weiler, J.H.H., ‘Editorial: Integration Through Fear’, 23 European Journal of International Law (2012) p. 1-5 Google Scholar.
115 This is true also in the States that receive financial aid, as was demonstrated by the Greek referendum in 2015 that saw almost 40% of voters in favour of the adjustment programme.
116 Fitoussi, J.-P. and Saraceno, F., ‘European economic governance: the Berlin–Washington Consensus’, 37 Cambridge Journal of Economics (2013) p. 479-496 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
117 See e.g. the declaration of the Eurosummit of 12 July 2015 (SN 4070/15).
118 ‘Voice is the mechanism of intraorganizational correction and recuperation’: Weiler, supra n. 9, at p. 2411, and more in general Hirschman, A.O., Exit, Voice, and Loyalty. Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States (Harvard University Press 1970)Google Scholar.
119 Craig, supra n. 39, at p. 28-30, who underlines the ‘shift from legislation to contract’ in this area.
120 Dawson, M. and de Witte, F., ‘From Balance to Conflict: A New Constitution for the EU’, 22 ELJ (2015) p. 204-222 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
121 Art. 126(10) TFEU; Armstrong, supra n. 1, at p. 604.
122 Reg. No. 1173/11.
123 The Fiscal Compact foresees specific competences of the ECJ only in case of failed compliance on the part of the States with Art. 3(2) of the Treaty itself (Art. 8). In prevailing opinion, the Court does not have the competence in the case of a concrete violation of the budgetary rules. For this, see R. Dehousse, ‘The “Fiscal Compact”: legal uncertainty and political ambiguity’, in 33 Policy Brief (2012), available also at <www.institutdelors.eu/media/fiscalpact_r.dehousse_ne_feb2012.pdf?pdf=ok>, visited 1 October 2016.
124 M. Everson, ‘The Fault of (European) Law in (Political and Social) Economic Crisis’, 24 Law and Critique (2013) p. 107-129.
125 C. Joerges previously cited in n. 10; Maduro, supra n. 18, chs. 4 and 5.
126 F. Fabbrini, ‘States’ Equality v States’ Power: the Euro-crisis, Inter-state Relations and the Paradox of Domination’, 17 Cambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies (2015) p. 3-35.
127 Streeck, supra n. 106, ch. 2.
128 E.g. Kilpatrick, C., ‘On the Rule of Law and Economic Emergency: The Degradation of Basic Legal Values in Europe’s Bailouts’, 35 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies (2015) p. 325-353 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
129 Tuori, supra n. 28, at p. 33-35; Armstrong, supra n. 1, at p. 609-612.
130 V. Skouris, The Court of Justice and the Financial Crisis: New Treaties, New Competences, Future Prospects, <www.europeanlawinstitute.eu/fileadmin/user_upload/p_eli/General_Assembly/Keynote_Skouris__Vassilios.pdf>, visited 1 October 2016.
131 ECJ 26 June 2014, Case C-264/12, Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins v Fidelidade Mundial - Companhia de Seguros, para. 19.
132 ECJ 21 October 2014, Case C-665, Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais de Seguros e Afins v Via Directa - Companhia de Seguros SA; ECJ 7 March 2013, Case C-128/12, Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte and Others v BPN - Banco Português de Negócios SA.
133 Salomon, M.E., ‘Of Austerity, Human Rights and International Institutions’, 21 ELJ (2015) p. 521-545 CrossRefGoogle Scholar; G. Katrougalos, ‘The Greek Austerity Measures: Violations of Socio-Economic Rights’, I.Connect, 29 January 2013, <www.iconnectblog.com/2013/01/the-greek-austerity-measures-violations-of-socio-economic-rights>, visited 1 October 2016.
134 See Opinion of A.G. Wathelet, supra n. 111, paras. 92-98. In general, see Lenaerts, supra n. 28, at p. 759, with a further bibliography; Kilpatrick, supra n. 90, at p. 403.
135 See the essays collected in C. Kilpatrick and B. de Witte (eds.), Social Rights in Times of Crisis in the Eurozone, EUI Working Papers, Law, 2014/05.
136 This is clear, for example, in some sentences of the Greek State Council that, on the basis of the principle of proportionality, considered a series of rather unfavourable measures for the implementation of the first Memorandum regarding pensions and the salaries of public employees as lawful in consideration of the serious crisis and the consequent prevalence of national and European public interest. See, for example, decision 668/2012: E. Psychogiopoulou, ‘Welfare Rights in Crisis in Greece: The Role of Fundamental Rights Challenges’ and M. Yannakourou, ‘Challenging austerity measures affecting work rights at domestic and international level. The case of Greece’, both in Kilpatrick and de Witte, supra n. 135, respectively at p. 5 ff and p. 19 ff; C. Akrivopoulou, ‘Facing l’etat d’exception: The Greek Crisis Jurisprudence’, I.Connect, 11 July 2013, <www.iconnectblog.com/2013/07/facing-letat-dexception-the-greek-crisis-jurisprudence>, visited 1 October 2016.
137 Baraggia, supra n. 41, at p. 284-286; C. Fasone, Constitutional Courts Facing the Euro Crisis. Italy, Portugal and Spain in a Comparative Perspective, EUI Working Paper, MWP 2014/25, p. 24-30; M. Nogueira de Brito, ‘Putting Social Rights in Brackets? The Portuguese Experience with Welfare Challenges in Times of Crisis’, J. Gomes, ‘Social Rights in Crisis in the Eurozone. Work Rights in Portugal’ and R. Cisotta and D. Gallo, ‘The Portuguese Constitutional Court Case Law on Austerity Measures: A Reappraisal’ all in Kilpatrick and de Witte, supra n. 135, respectively at p. 57, p. 78 and p. 85.
138 Ruling of the Portuguese Constitutional Court 187 of April 2013, annulling some austerity measures of the 2013 Budget Act: see Fasone, supra n. 137, at p. 27-28; Coelho, G. and de Sousa, P.C., ‘La Morte Dei Mille Tagli’, 139(3) Giornale di diritto del lavoro e delle relazioni industriali (2013) p. 527 Google Scholar.
139 The Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal. Eighth and Ninth Review. Occasional Papers 164, European Commission, November 2013, § 6 and § 90 (p. 44), <ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/occasional_paper/2013/pdf/ocp164_en.pdf>, visited 1 October 2016.
140 Ibid. at para. 88 (p. 43).
141 Ibid. at para. 30 (p. 20) and para. 88 (p. 43).
142 ‘Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the 2015 National Reform Programme of Italy and delivering a Council opinion on the 2015 Stability Programme of Italy’, COM(2015) 262 final, § 9 and 10 respectively, <ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/csr2015/csr2015_italy_it.pdf>, visited 1 October 2016. Along the same lines, see Recommendation of the Council on the 2015 Italian national reform programme.
143 The reactions are available respectively at <www.keeptalkinggreece.com/2015/06/11/supreme-court-orders-greece-to-reverse-2012-pension-cuts-as-unconstitutional> and <www.latribune.fr/economie/union-europeenne/grece-les-coupes-dans-les-retraites-jugees-inconstitutionnelles-483130.html>, both visited 1 October 2016.
144 Eurosummit declaration of 12 July 2015, p. 3.
145 The Report is available at <ec.europa.eu/priorities/economic-monetary-union/docs/5-presidents-report_en.pdf>, visited 1 October 2016.
146 Ibid. at p. 8. See also Commission, ‘Recommendation for a Council Recommendation on the establishment of National Competitiveness Boards within the Euro Area’, COM (2015) 601 final.
147 Ibid. at p. 14.
148 Ibid. at p. 23.
149 Commission Decision (EU) 2015/1937 of 21 October 2015 establishing an independent advisory European Fiscal Board.
150 Streeck, supra n. 106, ch. 4.
151 E.g. Scharpf, supra n. 103, at p. 400.