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Neutralizing the Sovereignty Question Compromise Strategies in Constitutional Argumentations before European Integration and since

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 December 2006

András Jakab
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Abstract

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Social function of sovereignty – Taming sovereignty through compromise strategies – The sharing strategy – The creation of a new unreal bearer of sovereignty – Leaving sovereignty itself untouched but forbidding the use of it – Abolishing the concept – Redefining the concept – Challenges to the Westphalian paradigm of international legal sovereignty – National answers to the challenges put by European integration – A new compromise formula – Neutralizing the sovereignty question.

Keywords

SovereigntyCompromise StrategiesConstitutional ArgumentationEuropean IntegrationSharing StrategyMystifying StrategyChaining StrategyInstitutionalising StrategyAgent StrategySubstituting StrategyDisarmament StrategyWestphalian ParadigmUnited KingdomGermanyFranceHungaryAustriaNeutralizing Strategy
Type
Articles
Information
European Constitutional Law Review , Volume 2 , Issue 3 , October 2006 , pp. 375 - 397
Copyright
Asser Press 2006