Following recent developments in some European jurisdictions, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) proposed, on 9 February 2010, ‘to extend major shareholding notifications to instruments of similar economic effect to holding shares and entitlements to acquire shares’. This initiative pushes for mandatory Economic-only Disclosure of Major Shareholdings in Europe (EOD). By providing twenty arguments against the CESR proposal, this paper seeks to spur a lively discussion as to whether mandatory EOD is desirable. It puts forward that European institutions are well advised to refrain from implementing the CESR proposal in its current form. If at all, implementing a requirement to report to regulators (Economic- only Reporting – EOR) and limiting EOD to very large positions serves social welfare better than EOD and avoids major differences between European securities law and US securities regulation.

The question of how to optimise corporate governance with regard to the structure of remuneration systems and, particularly, executive compensation is presently more hotly debated than ever. Since flawed executive pay structures are considered to have contributed to the financial crisis by encouraging short-term risk-taking at the expense of long-term security, remuneration systems are re-evaluated at national, European and international level. The analysis of current regulatory and legislative reform initiatives of selected countries in Europe (United Kingdom, Switzerland and Germany) and the United States shows the fundamental common objective to sustain market confidence and promote financial stability by removing incentives for inappropriate risk-taking by firms. The internationally emerging remuneration model strives to ensure, to the widest extent possible, congruency between incentives and risks. The need for firms to concentrate on long-term rather than short-term performance is a recurring theme of the reform movement. However, a closer look at the different national regulatory and legislative initiatives reveals that the structural approaches to how to design a well-balanced remuneration system vary significantly as to the scope of application and the intensity and detail of the new regulation and legislation.

The Union legislator and the ECJ are trying to prevent forum shopping in cross-border insolvency cases through recourse to the following legal instruments: (1) guiding the process of interpreting the notion of COMI and determining that COMI in practice so as to avoid forum shopping; (2) determining the moment relevant for establishing the debtor's COMI, which should be relatively early; (3) introducing the perpetuatio fori principle that can frustrate debtors' attempts to transfer their COMI to another Member State; and (4) making it impossible to change international jurisdiction in cross-border insolvency matters after insolvency proceedings have been opened. However, there is no need to exclude the possibility of a transfer of the debtor's COMI that leads to the effective change of international jurisdiction before the request for the opening of insolvency proceedings is lodged, as it would be contrary to the freedom of establishment. It is thus submitted that in order to facilitate the exercise of fundamental freedoms, international jurisdiction in cross-border insolvency cases should be (de lege ferenda) determined not so much by the COMI as by the location of the registered office (statutory seat) of the debtor.

Recent events and trends have led to an increased awareness of the importance of Islamic law and a more widespread interest in the subject. However, many areas remain inaccessible and have received relatively little scholarly attention. One such is the law of business associations. The aim of this and a previous article (‘the first article’) is to alleviate this situation somewhat, providing a critical overview and facilitating further research.

The first article contained an overview of the classical sharia, looking at three Sunni schools by way of example, plus a comparison with Western concepts. This article considers the replacement of the sharia regimes by Western-style law and the interaction of the sharia with Western-style law.

Over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives have emerged as a global behemoth – the ‘800 pound gorilla’ of modern financial markets. In the wake of both their precipitous growth and prominence in the thick of the current global financial crisis, financial market regulators have found themselves under pressure to enhance their regulation of OTC derivatives markets. This paper explores both the private and social costs and benefits of OTC derivatives and the respective strengths and weaknesses of public and private systems of ordering in pursuit of the optimal mode of regulating OTC derivatives markets. On the basis of this exploration, this paper advocates employing modes of regulation which abandon the largely artificial distinction between public and private ordering, align the incentives of public and private actors and facilitate the long-term transfer of information and expertise between these actors in order to generate more nuanced and responsive regulation and thereby enhance social welfare.