Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-l7hp2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-24T05:23:52.193Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Improving the Governance of Financial Supervisors

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 October 2011

Luca Enriques  and
Gerard Hertig
Luca Enriques
Affiliation:
Professor of Law, University of Bologna, ECGI and Consob.
Gerard Hertig
Affiliation:
Professor of Law, ETH Zurich and ECGI.
Get access

Abstract

We offer three basic mechanisms to improve the governance of ‘normal times’ financial supervisors (as opposed to resolution agencies and systemic risk boards). To enhance supervisory effectiveness, we propose first to institutionalise strong CEOs, with boards or commissions being limited to basic policy decision-making and to monitoring. Second, lower-level staff would get increased line responsibilities. Finally, subjecting supervisors to reinforced disclosure requirements would improve market responsiveness.

Keywords

supervisory agency decision-makingfinancial supervisionsupervisory responsivenesstransparencyflat hierarchies
Type
Articles
Information
European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR) , Volume 12 , Issue 3 , September 2011 , pp. 357 - 378
Copyright
Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press and the Authors 2011

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)