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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 17 February 2009
Does traditional antitrust law tally with the special sphere of the New Economy, and especially with phenomena connected with the Internet? This issue is a disputed one. Whereas the predominant opinion among the antitrust authorities and experts in antitrust law is that antitrust law provisions and principles of application are generally sufficient in order to assess the new phenomena adequately, there are also those who refer to the specific nature of the Internet economy and call for restraint when applying antitrust law provisions in this sphere. In order to resolve this disputed issue it is important to keep in mind the numerous problems in the border zone between antitrust law and the Internet. For example, one argument occasionally submitted is that the Internet medium facilitates inadmissible concerted action. In these cases it is considered very difficult to bring the offenders to justice. These fears are open to doubt. The Microsoft proceedings have shown that statements made on the Internet or within an intranet are stored in numerous places and are easier to trace than would be the case if an informal meeting were held. However, practical experience is still lacking with Internet-based hard-core cartels. At the conference of the US Federal Trade Commission in May 2001, one of the focal themes was price fixing on the Internet.
1 Monti, , “Competition in the New Economy, X. International Competition Law Conference in Berlin”, 21.5.2001Google Scholar, SPEECH/01/232 <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start>; Pitovsky, , “Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property”, 68 Antitrust Law Journal (2001) 913.Google Scholar
2 Ahlborn, /Evans, /Padilla, , “Competition Policy in the New Economy: Is European Competition Law Up to the Challenge?”, European Competition Law Review, ECLR (2001) 156Google Scholar; Posner, , “Antitrust in the New Economy”, 68 Antitrust Law Journal (2001) 925Google Scholar; Vajda, /Gahnström, , “EC Competition Law and the Internet”, ECLR (2000) 94Google Scholar; Veljanovski, , “EC Antitrust in the New Economy: Is the European Commission's View of the Network Economy Right?”, ECLR (2001) 115Google Scholar. General advocates of the idea of self-regulation of the Internet are Johnson, /Post, , “Law And Borders – The Rise of Law in Cyberspace”, 48 Stanford Law Review (1996) 1367.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
3 Beck, , “Die wettbewerbspolitische Relevanz des Internet”, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, WuW (1999) 460, 462Google Scholar; Bundeskartellamt, Kooperationen zwischen Wettbewerbern (2000) p. 9
4 As regards the use of the personal e-mail communication of Bill Gates in the Microsoft proceedings see the references in Sullivan, /Grimes, , The Law of Antitrust (St. Paul, Minn.: West 2000) at 854, e.g.Google Scholar: “Microsoft should try to cut off [Netscape's] air supply.”
5 See the report at <http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/9550.html>.
6 For example, the ban on the merger between MCI Worldcom and Sprint issued by the EC Commission in June 2000: Case M.1741, Commission press statement IP/00/668 of 28.6.2000. See on this point European Commission, XXXth Report on Competition Policy 2000, 2001, Point 249, fig. 6.
7 As regards the distinction between Internet alliances of the first generation (predominantly joint ventures) and the second generation (predominantly mergers), see Klotz, , “Ausgewählte Probleme des Internet-Rechts”, 23/24.11.2000, at 29 et seq.Google Scholar, download at: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2000_024_de.pdf>. The alliances of the first generation (up to about 1999) concerned the development, testing and initial marketing of specific Internet applications. The alliances of the second generation (since about 2000) concern mergers between network operators and major media enterprises (“contents” providers) e.g., AOL/Time Warner.
8 E.g., access to the network user within the last mile, now regulated by Regulation (EC) No 2887/2000 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 December 2000 on unbundled access to the local loop, OJ L [2000] 336/4.
9 Klotz, supra n. 7, at 27.
10 See, for example, the separation of telecommunications networks and cable TV networks by the Commission Directive 1999/64/EC of 23 June 1999 amending Directive 90/388/EEC (OJ L [1999] 175/39), in this respect: European Commission, XXIXth Report on Competition Policy 1999, 2000, Point 65 et seq.
11 Regarding the functions of electronic platforms see in detail Köhler, , “Gründung und Nutzung von Internet Marketplaces – die Rahmenbedingungen des europäischen und deutschen Kartellrechts”, Kommunikation & Recht (2000) 569Google Scholar. Generally see also European Commission, XXXth Report on Competition Policy 2000, 2001, after Point 215.
12 If one includes into the combination game the letter A for Administration meaning government offices, then A2A, A2B and A2C result in three further channels of communication via the Internet. The abbreviation P2P (peer-to-peer) has a completely different meaning: here net users are connected directly without an intermediate server. If the exchange of data is also anonymous and encrypted, it is not possible to trace the data being exchanged. Following the court proceedings against Napster, P2P architectures are being used increasingly to exchange sensitive or proprietary data, see on this point Spindler, , “Urheberrecht und Tauschplattformen im Internet”, Juristenzeitung, JZ (2002) 60.Google Scholar
13 Reference to possible savings in: Gassner, , “Intemet-Handelsplattformen im Spiegel des Kartellrechts”, Multimedia und Recht, MMR (2001) 140Google Scholar and in: Schaub, , “Kartellrechtliche Probleme des elektronischen Marktplatzes aus der Sicht der EU-Kommission”, page 2,2.3.2001Google Scholar, available for downloading at: <http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2001_002_de.pdf>.
However, the crisis in the New Economy which commenced in the second half of 2000 also has implications for electronic marketplaces. The stock exchange rates of pertinent enterprises (e.g., Freemarkets) have lost 90% of their value in some cases. The initially euphoric forecasts for the significance of B2B commerce have to undergo a downward correction.
14 Apart from this, an independently organized platform can be launched separately on the stock exchange, see Immenga, F./Lange, , “Elektronische Marktplätze: Wettbewerbsbeschränkende Verhaltensweisen im Internet?”, Recht der lnternationalen Wirtschaft, RIW (2000) 733.Google Scholar
15 See the statements of the Bundeskartellamt in the Covisint decision (Kommunikation & Recht 2000, 604, 607). In 1995 there were 28 B2B marketplaces in the world, in 1999 the figure was 332 and in July 200 the figure had increased to 1090 marketplaces. In May 2001 there were about 1,400 such virtual marketplaces, see Siiddeutsche Zeitung of 21 May 2001, p.2.
16 Attempts at providing a definition therefore remain vague. The terms electronic marketplaces, internet platforms, electronic hubs, virtual marketplaces and B2B exchanges are used interchangeably, and also in combination.
17 Classifications can be found in: Köhler, supra n. 11, at 569-570, Gassner, supra n. 13, at 141-142. Regarding the historical development see F. Immenga/Lange, supra n. 14, at 734: Initially, independent intermediaries provided their (neutral) platforms against payment of a fee. In a second step platform providers entered into strategic alliances with their customers. Finally, buyers and consumers established their own trade platforms (ISM's: industry-sponsored marketplaces). And for the moment the final step appears to be the concentration of existing platforms to mega-platforms.
18 Schaub, supra n. 13, at 2.
19 Where such procurement takes the form of an auction, one speaks of a reverse auction, see Köhler, supra n. 11, at 570. The counter-term, namely for a sales auction, is forward auction. The various transaction mechanisms can be practised simultaneously on an Internet platform, see Bundeskartellamt, supra n. 3, at 605.
20 F. Immenga/Lange, supra n. 14, at 735.
21 F. Immenga/Lange, ibid., 734-735. In the Covisint case, for example, there is mention of information and communications systems for contingency planning, product delivery, stocks management, delivery chain planning, materials administration, logistics, material transportation and customs, see Bundeskartellamt, supra n. 3, at 605.
22 See, e.g., Gassner, supra n. 13, at 141; Jestaedt, , “Funktionalität, Effizienz und Wettbewerb: B2B-Marktplätze und das Kartellrecht”, Betriebs-Berater (2001) 581 footnote 4Google Scholar. From the viewpoint of antitrust law this terminology is unfortunate since “horizontal” refers to the relationship among competitors themselves and “vertical” to relations between the chain of delivery and the value-added chain. Hence, both horizontal and vertical relations in the sense of cartel law exist in horizontal and vertical marketplaces. It would therefore be preferable to speak of sector-specific and cross-sector or general marketplaces.
23 An intermediate position is occupied by platforms for so-called MRO-goods (maintenance, repair, operations). On the one hand, these goods are of a vertical nature since they are created for the needs of a certain sector. On the other hand, the products traded here can often be used in other sectors as well. One example is the platform “CC-Markets”, see on this point Bundeskartellamt, decision of. 23 October 2000, B 3 – 72303 – U – 76/00 “CC-Markets”.
24 Regarding the growing importance of PTNs see the study by Jupiter Media Metrix of May 2001; press release at <http://www.jup.com/company/pressrelease.jsp?doc=pr010523>.
25 Cartel authority decisions on Covisint originate from the Bundeskartellamt, supra n. 15, of the US Federal Trade Commission (<http://ftc.gov/opa/2000/09/covisint.htm>) and of the EC Commission (press release IP/01/1155 v. 31.7.2001, available for downloading at <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh>).
26 Regarding problems of antitrust law with regard to electronic marketplaces, see Ahlborn, /Seeliger, , “Business to Business Exchanges: EG-kartellrechtliche Probleme bei Unternehmenskooperationen im Internet”, Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht, EuZW (2001) 552Google Scholar; Alese, , “B2B exchanges and EC Competition Law: 2B or not 2B?”, ECLR (2001) 325Google Scholar; Gassner, supra n. 13; F. Immenga/Lange, supra n. 14; Jestaedt, supra n. 22; Köhler, supra n. 11; Lancefield, , “The Regulatory Hurdles Ahead in B2B”, ECLR (2001) 9Google Scholar; Lange, , “Unternehmenskooperationen im Internet und EG-Kartellrecht”, Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht, EWS (2000) 291Google Scholar; Schaub, supra n. 13.
27 See on this point Beck, supra n. 3, at 460et seq.; Gassner, supra n. 13, at 142; Köhler, supra n. 11, at 571.
28 In this sense (based on the example of other markets) Urrutia, Internet and its effects on competition, 10 July 2000, at 3, available for downloading at:
<http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/speeches/text/sp2000_011_en.pdf>; Gassner, supra n. 13, at 143-144. Ultimately, the Commission left the question as to the relevant product market open in the merger control proceedings concerning Internet distribution of books, see references and discussion in: Seeliger, , “EG-kartellrechtliche Probleme in Vertikalverhältnissen beim Vertrieb über das Internet”, WuW (2000) 1174, 1185.Google Scholar
29 Schaub, supra n. 13, at 3 und 5 et seq. with reference to pertinent Commission decisions. See on this point also the Bundeskartellamt, “CC-Markets”, supra n. 23, Point 32; Bundeskartell-amt, decision of 26 January 2001, B 3 - 25130 - U - 110/00 “RubberNetwork.com” Point 21.
30 Press release of the Commission IP/01/670 of 8 May 2001, available for downloading at <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh>. Later on the project was abandoned by the participants.
31 See, for example, the thwarted merger plans between EMI and BMG: The enterprises concerned argued that the traditional market definition (sale of CDs) would have to be abandoned. It was argued that distribution via the Internet would have to be included. Since the merger project was abandoned, the EC Commission did not form a conclusive opinion in this respect, see Neue Zürcher Zeitung, NZZ of 2 May 2001, at 9.
32 A critical approach to narrow market definition within the Internet economy is expressed by the Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim BMWi (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie), Expert Opinion of 7 July 2001, Wettbewerbspolitik für den Cyberspace, available for downloading at: <http://www.bmwi.de/Homepage/download/doku/Doku495.pdf>, at 25 et seq., Point 74 et seq., containing prospects for alternative methods of market definition which no longer turn exclusively on the market opponent but also on the economic plans of competing market participants.
33 Antitrust law relating to distribution cartels is an exception, see Martínez-López, , “Distribution sélective et Internet”, Competition Policy Newsletter 2001, No.2 – 06, at 7Google Scholar; Pautke, /Schultze, , “Internet und Vertriebskartellrecht – Hausaufgaben für die Europäische Kommission”, Betriebs-Berater (2001) 317Google Scholar; Seeliger, supra n. 28; Szönyi, , “Zum Verkauf über das Internet im Rahmen eines selektiven Vertriebsbindungssystems”, GRUR Int. (2000) 1036Google Scholar; Vajda/Gahnström, supra n. 2, 103.
34 Regarding German law see Zimmer in: Immenga, /Mestmäcker, , Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB), 3rd ed. (2001)Google Scholar § 1 GWB note 401 et seq.; regarding European law see Emmerich in: Immenga, /Mestmäcker, , EG-Wettbewerbsrecht (Beck 1997) at 263 et seq.Google Scholar; Immenga in: Immenga, /Mestmäcker, . EG-Wettbewerbsrecht (Beck 1997) pp. 939 et seqGoogle Scholar. and supplementary vol., Art. 2 Merger Regulation, note 1 et seq.
35 See Commission Notice on the concept of concentration under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ [1998] C 66 (2.3.1998).
36 See Commission Notice on the concept of full-function joint ventures under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, ibid.
37 See Commission Notice on the distinction between concentrative and cooperative joint ventures under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 of 21 December 1989 on the control of concentrations between undertakings, OJ [1994] C 385/1. The legal situation discussed is based on the amendment regulation of 30.6.1997 (OJ [1998] L 180/1), effective as of 1.3.1998.
38 It is disputed, however, whether national merger control law alone or national competition law in general, i.e., also the national cartel interdiction, is excluded; see on this point Immenga in Immenga, /Mestmäcker, , EG-Wettbewerbsrecht (1997) at 1058.Google Scholar
39 See Commission Notice on the concept of full-function joint ventures, supra n. 36, Point 16: Covenants directly connected with execution of the merger will be appraised together with the merger (ancillary restraints). If the establishment of the joint venture results in co-ordination of the competitive conduct of the parents (co-operative full-function joint venture), appraisal will take place under Art. 81 EC Treaty within the context of the merger control procedure. Restraints on competition which constitute neither a covenant nor a direct consequence of the establishment will be appraised in a separate procedure pursuant to Regulation 17.
40 See supra nn. 15, 23 and 29.
41 According to its Notice on the Concept of Concentration, supra n. 35, the Commission assumes joint control “where two or more undertakings or persons have the possibility of exercising decisive influence over another undertaking. Decisive influence in this sense normally means the power to block actions which determine the strategic commercial behaviour of an undertaking.” (Point 19). The veto rights normally accorded to minority shareholders with regard to changes in the statute, an increase or decrease in the capital are not sufficient in this respect. Rather, the veto right has to extend to strategic and business policy decisions in the joint venture, e.g., to the budget, the business plan, major investments or the appointment of senior management. The power to exercise a decisive influence on the day-to–day running of an undertaking is not required for the assumption of joint control (Point 22(f)).
42 Also in view of Sec. 37(1) Nr. 4 of the German Act Against Restraints of Competition, (“substantial competitive influence”). Regarding the much earlier intervention of German merger control, see Bechtold, , Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (GWB), 2nd ed. (Munich: Beck 1999) § 37 GWB note 1.Google Scholar
43 Regarding the difficult juxtaposition of joint control by the parent corporations and economic independence of the full-function joint venture, see Immenga in: Immenga, /Mestmäcker, , EG-Wettbewerbsrecht (1997) at 942 et seq.Google Scholar
44 See OJ [2001] EC C 49/4 (15.2.2001) and see supra n. 25.
45 See Süddeutsche Zeitung of 5.3.2001, at 23. See also the skepticism expressed in the 14th main expert opinion issued by the Monopoly Commission 1998/1999,2000, Point 76: “The concentration of purchase power can result in a shift in the negotiating power to the detriment of suppliers. In order to recover lost negotiating power, suppliers could resort to horizontal mergers. Consequently, the common electronic buying platforms on the Internet generate a risk of not only concerted practices but also of a strengthening of concentration at the level of suppliers as a consequence. Compared with these risks, the rationalisation benefits for manufacturers due to the establishment of joint instead of individual buying platforms would appear to be minor.”
46 Federal Cartel Office, Covisint, supra n. 15, C14; European Commission, Covisint, supra n. 25; CC-Markets, supra n. 23, Point 20; European Commission, decision of 25.4.2001, COMP/M.2398 “Supralift” Point 11.
47 RubberNetwork.com, supra n. 29, Point 10-13.
48 Jestaedt, supra n. 22, at 585.
49 Emmerich in: Immenga, /Mestmäcker, , EG-Wettbewerbsrecht (1997) at 168, 211Google Scholar; Köhler, supra n. 11, at 575, making a distinction depending on whether or not a supply obligation is agreed on.
50 OJ [2001] C 3/2 (6.1.2001). See on this point Geiger, , “Die neuen Leitlinien der EG-Kommission zur Anwendbarkeit von Art.81 EG auf Vereinbarungen über horizontale Zusammenarbeit”, EuZW (2000) 325.Google Scholar
51 Guidelines, Point 116 and general exceptions from the cartel interdiction (“co-operation concept” = co-operation between competing companies that cannot independently carry out activity) in Point 24. The Commission distinguishes between horizontal and vertical agreements, (ibid., Point 117). Since the horizontal aspect is in the foreground of joint buying via electronic platforms, the vertical issues are excluded in the present context. Regarding restrictions in vertical relations, see Köhler, supra n. 11, at 575.
52 In this case the savings would probably not be passed on to customers, see Guidelines, Point 128. Hence, the interaction between buying and selling markets are of crucial significance in the eyes of the Commission. Köhler disagrees with the viewpoint expressed by this opinion, namely, to deny an independent significance to competition on the demand side, supra n. 11, at 575 footnote 34.
53 Guidelines, Point 130.
54 Guidelines, Point 132-134.
55 Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community, OJ [2001] C 368/13 (22.12.2001). The guidelines on horizontal cooperation agreements do not affect the de minimis notice according to Point 15 of the guidelines.
56 De minimis-notice, Point 7 a). The threshold for vertical restrictions is 15%, see Point 7 b). The market share thresholds do not apply to hardcore restrictions (Point 11) such as price fixing, allocation of markets or limitation of output or sales.
57 See on this point supra n. 52.
58 A discussion of the question whether varying requirements for interference in the cartel interdiction and merger control would be desirable de lege ferenda (catchword: “concentration privilege”) can be found in the paper published by the Bundeskartellamt, supra n. 3, at 29-30.
59 See on this point in general Ackermann, , Art.85 Abs.1 EGV und die rule of reason (Köln: Heymanns 1997)Google Scholar with review by Heinemann, , 36 CMLRev (1999) 859.Google Scholar
60 Commission Proposal for a Council Regulation on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, COM (2000) (582) final (27.9.2000). See on this point Monopolkommission, , Sondergutachten 28: Kartellpolitische Wende in der Europäischen Union? (1999)Google Scholar; Deringer, , “Stellungnahme zum Weißbuch der Europäischen Kommission über die Modernisierung der Vorschriften zur Anwendung der Art.85 und 86 EG-Vertrag (Art.81 und 82 EG)”, EuZW (2000) 5Google Scholar; Deselaers, /Obst, , “Weißbuch zum Europäischen Kartellrecht – Rechtssicherheit ade?”, EWS (2000) 41Google Scholar; Fikentscher, , “Das Unrecht einer Wettbewerbsbeschränkung: Kritik an Weißbuch und VO-Entwurf zu Art.81, 82 EG-Vertrag”, WuW (2001) 446Google Scholar; Möschel, , “Systemwechsel im Europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht? Zum Weißbuch der EG-Kommission zu den Art.81 et seq. EG-Vertrag”, JZ (2000) 61.Google Scholar
61 See supra n. 47.
62 On questions of compulsory use see Köhler, supra n. 11, at 577-578.
63 Commission Notice on restrictions directly related and necessary to concentrations, OJ [2001] C 188/5 (4.7.2001).
64 Ancillary Restraints Notice, supra n. 63, Point 45.
65 Expressly in Point 28 of the Ancillary Restraints Notice.
66 Commission Regulation (EC) No 2790/1999 of 22 December 1999 on the application of Article 81 (3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices, OJ [ 1999] L 336/21.
67 European Commission, “MyAircraft.com”, Point 24: “These clauses are necessary to ensure that the joint venture is established on a solid base.”
68 The precise term was not stated on the grounds of secrecy.
69 References in Köhler, supra n. 11, at 572 footnote 22.
70 See on this point Köhler, ibid., pp. 572et seq.; Jestaedt, supra n. 22, at 586.
71 See on this point, e.g., Doherty, , “Just What are Essential Facilities?”, CMLRev. (2001) 397Google Scholar; Heinemann, , Immaterialgüterschutz in der Wettbewerbsordnung (Mohr Siebeck 2002) at 502 et seq.Google Scholar
72 See on this prerequisite decision of the ECJ, C-7/97, Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, (1998) ECR I-7791 (26.11.1998); on this point Fleischer, /Weyer, , “Neues zur ‘essential facilities’-Doktrin im Europäischen Wettbewerbsrecht”, WuW (1999) 350.Google Scholar
73 Regarding the economic background to standardisation, see Fleischer, /Doege, , “Der Fall United States v. Microsoft – Zwischenbilanz eines kartellrechtlichen Jahrhundertverfahrens”, WuW (2000) 705, 709Google Scholar, with further references.
74 See on this point Köhler, supra n. 11, at 578-579.
75 Supra n. 50, Chapter 6, Point 159 et seq.
76 Guidelines on horizontal co-operation agreements (see supra note 50), Point 163.
77 E.g., agreements through which a national manufacturers' association establishes a standard and exerts pressure on third parties not to place products which are not consonant with that standard onto the market, Guidelines on horizontal co-operation agreements, Point 165.
78 Guidelines on horizontal co-operation agreements, Point 166.
79 Guidelines on horizontal co-operation agreements, Point 169 et seq. Special problems are posed by de facto standards which are protected by proprietary rights, see Point 175 of the guidelines.
80 Bundeskartellamt (see supra note 15), D I No.5 a).
81 This also applies where exclusive rights apply to the standard. Establishment of a standard within the context of a recognised standards organisation assumes an obligation incumbent on the rights holder to grant a license to any third party against payment of an adequate licence fee; see, e.g., Commission communication of 27 October 1992 on intellectual property rights and standardization (COM(92) 445 final), at 5-6 point 2.2.3-2.2.5 and at 16 et seq. point 4.3.1 et seq.
82 Supra n. 15.
83 Regarding the definition of vertical and horizontal marketplaces see supra text on n. 22.
84 See on this point Lomholt, , Competition Policy Newsletter 1998, No. 3, at 7 et seq.Google Scholar
85 Decision of the ECJ, C-241/91 P & C-242/91 P, RTE and ITP v. Commission, (1995) ECR, I-743(6.4.1995).
86 See supra text on n. 71.
87 Compare the caution exercised by the Court of First Instance and by the Court of Justice when assuming an obligation to contract in the decision of the ECJ of 12.6.1997, T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke v. Commission, (1997) ECR II-923; ECJ decision of 26.11.1998, C-7/97 Oscar Bronner v. Mediaprint, (1998) ECR I-7791. As a rule, there will not be a separate request for access to a standard. Rather, general access to the platform will be sought. See on this point supra 3.5.
88 See, e.g., Bundeskartellamt, supra n. 3, at 11: A higher degree of transparency can be detrimental to newcomers since they will be noticed sooner and counter-measures can be taken.
89 Köhler, supra n. 11, at 576.
90 Emmerich in: Immenga, /Mestmäcker, , EG-Wettbewerbsrecht (Beck 1997) at 204–205.Google Scholar
91 Decision of the ECJ, C-7/95P, John Deere Ltd v. Commission, (1998) ECR I-3111 (28.5.1998) paras. 80-92. In its guidelines on horizontal co-operation agreements the Commission expressly excluded the field of exchange of information (Guidelines, Point 10). The wording (“They are only concerned with those types of co-operation which potentially generate efficiency gains”) indicates that the Commission takes a critical view.
92 See, e.g., European Commission, supra n. 46, “Supralift” Point 26; Bundeskartellamt, supra n. 15, “Covisint” C 6; European Commission, supra n. 25, “Covisint”. See in detail Ahlborn/ Seeliger, supra n. 26, pp. 556 et seq.
93 See on this point based on the example of German antitrust law Zimmer, in: Immenga, /Mestmäcker, , Gesetz gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen, 3rd ed. (2001) § 1 GWB note 390 et seq.Google Scholar
94 For a general legal appraisal of such auctions see Spindler, /Wiebe, , Internet-Auktionen (Beck 2001).Google Scholar
95 See on this point Jestaedt, supra n. 22, 583-584, who argues that protection of confidential competition should step back here. The party staging the auction is responsible for deciding on the modus of the auction.