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Hybrid Governance Across National Jurisdictions as a Challenge to Constitutional Law

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 February 2009

Christoph Engel
Christoph Engel
Affiliation:
Director, Max Planck Project Group “Common Goods: Law, Politics and Economics”, Bonn.
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Extract

A technology often reaches perfection when its successor is already in place. Miraculously speedy and reliable punch card readers were finally available on the market when demand shifted to personal computers, to cite only one example. Do constitutions follow the same evolutionary pattern? Constitutional law, in general, and the doctrine of fundamental freedoms, in particular, are in admirable shape. Their dogmatics have been amply tested; they are elegant and rich. But they have been developed for the nation state. Yet governance reality is increasingly different. The state is competing with foreign, international and private governing authorities, or it is joining them in hybrid efforts. Will deconstitutionalisation ensue? Or will the existing constitutions be able to face, or even alter, the new reality?

Type
Research Article
Information
European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR) , Volume 2 , Issue 3-4 , September 2001 , pp. 569 - 583
Copyright
Copyright © T.M.C. Asser Press and the Authors 2001

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References

1 A coherent overview of competing definitions, and how they have evolved, is to be found in Mayntz, R., New Challenges to Governance Theory (Florence: European University Institute 1998Google Scholar, The Robert Schuman Centre, Jean Monnet Chair Papers 50).

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23 See again BVerfGE 89, 155.

24 BVerfGE 4, 157.

25 BVerfGE 92, 26.

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42 This is how the German Constitutional Court brought foreign private law under constitutional control, if autonomous German rules of conflict of laws oblige German courts to apply such rules, BVerfGE 31, 58 – Spanier.

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45 BVerfGE 92, 26, 26 and 41 et seq.

46 BVerfGE 31, 58, 77.

47 BVerfGE 6, 32, 44 (restricted right to leave the country); BVerfGE 6, 290, 299 (limited protection of property lying abroad); BVerfGE 77, 1, 47 (only the conditional right of foreign spouses to immigrate).

48 BVerfGE 55, 349, 366 et seq. – Hess; see also BVerfGE 58, 1, 41 – Eurocontrol I; Engel, , Völkerrecht als Tatbestandsmerkmal, supra n. 43, 101–130Google Scholar (on consensus over the interpretation of public international law rules).

49 These are the basic elements of the dogmatics of fundamental freedoms under German constitutional law. In German they read “geeignet, erforderlich, angemessen”. For an overview see e.g. Ipsen, J., Staatsrecht II (Grundrechte), 3rd ed. (Neuwied: Luchterhand 2000), R 169–182Google Scholar; Pieroth, B./ Schlink, B., Grundrechte (Staatsrecht II), 16th ed. (Heidelberg: Müller 2000) R 279–297.Google Scholar

50 BVerfGE 92, 26, 43 et seq.

51 Ibid., 44.

52 BVerfGE 59, 63, 90 et seq. – Eurocontrol II.

53 BVerfGE 55, 349, 364 et seq.

54 Leading case BVerfGE 55, 349 – Hess; more by Hofmann, supra n. 34, 108-111; Klein, E., “Anspruch auf diplomatischen Schutz?”, in: Der diplomatische Schutz im Völker- und Europarecht (Ress, G./Stein, T. [eds.]) (Baden-Baden: Nomos 1996) 125–136.Google Scholar

55 BVerfGE 55, 349, 364 et seq.

56 See in particular the preamble, Art. I Il, Art. 23-26, Art. 59 Basic Law; classic Vogel, K., Die Verfassungsentscheidung für die offene Staatlichkeit (Tübingen: Mohr 1964).Google Scholar

57 Art. 23 and 24 Basic Law.

58 Art. 59 Basic Law.

59 Art. 25 Basic Law.

60 BVerfGE 4, 157, 170.

61 BVerfGE 89, 155.

62 See in greater detail Engel, , “A Constitutional Framework for Private Governance”, Preprints aus der Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter Bonn: 2001/2004.Google Scholar

63 BAGE 1, 185, 193.

64 Consequently, the Federal Court for Labour Law gave in, BAGE 52, 88, 97 s.

65 More by Engel, “Constitutional Framework”, supra n. 62.