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Wading Knee-Deep into the Rubicon: Escalation and the Morality of Limited Strikes

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 July 2020

Daniel R. Brunstetter
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Abstract

Limited strikes are arguably different from war insofar as they are more circumscribed, less destructive, and cost less in blood and treasure to employ. However, what they can achieve is also considerably more circumscribed than what is set out by the goals of war. How do we morally evaluate limited strikes? As part of the roundtable, “The Ethics of Limited Strikes,” this essay argues that we need to turn to the ethics of limited of force, or jus ad vim, to do so. Two moral assumptions that are the keystone to jus ad vim can shed light on the moral imperatives and ethical dilemmas of undertaking limited strikes. First, such strikes should be seen as an alternative to war, and not part of the jus ad bellum last resort process. What I call the “Rubicon assessment” determines at what level force should be used: at the level of war, with all its costs and unpredictability, or at that of the more predictable and less costly limited force. Second, limited strikes should adhere to a “presumption against escalation”; that is, a moral commitment not to escalate to war. This essay highlights these moral principles in five different limited strike scenarios: “hot pursuit,” “red line,” “the last straw,” “the point of no return,” and “the right of retaliation.” The conclusion explores the notion of justice after limited strikes, or what I call jus post vim, to show that while what can be accomplished by limited strikes is inherently constrained, they can, if used morally and in tune with diplomacy, be of service in the quest for peace.

Keywords

just warjus ad vimlimited forcelimited strikesescalationSoleimani strikeTrump AdministrationSyria red lineethics of force
Type
Roundtable: The Ethics of Limited Strikes
Information
Ethics & International Affairs , Volume 34 , Issue 2 , Summer 2020 , pp. 161 - 173
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2020. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs

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References

NOTES

1 Barack Obama, quoted in Zeke J. Miller, “Obama Makes Case for Strike on Syria,” TIME, September 10, 2013, swampland.time.com/2013/09/10/obama-makes-case-for-strike-on-syria/.

2 Heinze, Eric A. and Neilsen, Rhiannon, “Limited Force and the Return of Reprisals in the Law of Armed Conflict,” Ethics & International Affairs 34, no. 2 (July 2020), pp. 175–188Google Scholar.

3 Clark, Ian, Waging War: A Philosophical Introduction, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), p. 19CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

4 Walzer, Michael, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with Historical Illustrations (New York: Basic Books, 2006), p. xvGoogle Scholar; and Brunstetter, Daniel R., “In Defense of Jus ad Vim: Why We Need a Moral Framework for the Use of Limited Force,” in Galliott, Jai, ed., Force Short of War in Modern Conflict: Jus Ad Vim (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2019), pp. 284–307Google Scholar.

5 Brunstetter, Daniel R. and Braun, Megan, “From Jus ad Bellum to Jus ad Vim: Recalibrating Our Understanding of the Moral Use of Force,” in “Just War and Its Critics: The Ethics of War and Peace,” special section, Ethics & International Affairs 27, no. 1 (2013), pp. 87–106CrossRefGoogle Scholar; see especially pp. 95–96.

6 Ibid., pp. 97–100.

7 Bogdan Belei (guest blogger for Micah Zenko), “Guest Post: Obama, Don't Cross the Rubicon in Syria,” Council on Foreign Relations, November 20, 2015, www.cfr.org/blog/guest-post-obama-dont-cross-rubicon-syria.

8 O'Driscoll, Cian, “At All Costs and in Spite of All Terror? The Victory of Just War,” Review of International Studies 41, no. 4 (October 2015), pp. 799–811CrossRefGoogle Scholar; cf. Orend, Brian, “Jus Post Bellum, Fractured Sovereignty, and the Limits of Postwar Rehabilitation,” in Brunstetter, Daniel R. and Holeindre, Jean-Vincente, eds., The Ethics of War and Peace Revisited: Moral Challenges in an Era of Contested and Fragmented Sovereignty (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2018), pp. 265–86Google Scholar.

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11 Brunstetter, Daniel R., “Justice after the Use of Limited Force: Victory and the Moral Dilemmas of Jus Post Vim,” in Hom, Andrew R., O'Driscoll, Cian, and Mills, Kurt, eds., Moral Victories: The Ethics of Winning Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 214–30Google Scholar; for a discussion of how this might differ from victory in war, see p. 127.

12 “When Do Limited Strikes ‘Work’? Micah Zenko Explains the Logic of Trump's Syria Intervention—and Its Chances of Success,” interview by Priscilla Alvarez, Atlantic, April 8, 2017, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/trump-syria-strike/522363/.

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14 Brunstetter and Braun, “From Jus ad Bellum to Jus ad Vim,” p. 99.

15 Ibid., pp. 96–97.

16 “Balakot: Indian Air Strikes Target Militants in Pakistan,” BBC News, February 26, 2019, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47366718.

17 Rafia Zakaria, “India Adopts Bush's ‘Hot Pursuit’ Principle,” New Republic, March 1, 2019, newrepublic.com/article/153200/india-adopts-bushs-hot-pursuit-principle.

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21 Asif Ghafoor, quoted in “Pakistan Shoots Down Two Indian Jets in Kashmir after Air Strikes,” ABC, “News,” February 27, 2019, www.abc.net.au/news/2019-02-27/pakistan-shoots-down-two-indian-jets-in-kashmir/10854976.

22 Florence Parly, quoted in “Les Etats-Unis, la France et le Royaume-Uni frappent la Syrie,” Radio France Internationale, April 14, 2018, www.rfi.fr/moyen-orient/20180414-etats-unis-france-royaume-uni-syrie-trump (quote translated by the author).

23 Leon Panetta, “Remarks by Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta at the Saban Center” (transcript, Brookings Institution, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, Washington, D.C., December 2, 2011), United States Department of Defense, “News Transcript,” archive.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4937.

24 McInnis et al., North Korean Nuclear Challenge, pp. 2, 34.

25 Quoted in the French government's official description of the phone called between President Macron and President Rohani: “Entretien téléphonique entre le Président de la République et M. Hassan ROHANI, Président de la République islamique d'Iran,” Élysée, January 7, 2020, www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2020/01/07/entretien-telephonique-entre-le-president-de-la-republique-et-m-hassan-rohani-president-de-la-republique-islamique-diran (quote translated by the author).

26 Donald Trump, quoted in “Congress, Stop President Trump's Rush to War with Iran,” New York Times, “Opinion,” January 4, 2010, www.nytimes.com/2020/01/04/opinion/editorials/trump-iran-threats-Suleimani.html.

27 Nancy Pelosi, “Dear Colleague on Introduction of War Powers Resolution,” press release, Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House, “Newsroom,” January 5, 2020, www.speaker.gov/newsroom/1520-0.

28 Mohammad Javad Zarif, quoted in “Iran Does Not Seek Escalation or War, but Will Defend Itself—Foreign Minister Tweets,” Reuters, January 8, 2020, www.reuters.com/article/iraq-security-iran-zarif/iran-does-not-seek-escalation-or-war-but-will-defend-itself-foreign-minister-tweets-idUSL1N29D050.

29 Heinze, Eric A., “The Evolution of International Law in Light of the ‘Global War on Terror,’” Review of International Studies 37, no. 3 (July 2011), pp. 1083–84CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Deeks, Ashley, “‘Unwilling or Unable’: Toward a Normative Framework for Extra-Territorial Self-Defense,” Virginia Journal of International Law 52, no. 3 (2012), pp. 483–550Google Scholar.

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31 Brunstetter, “Justice after the Use of Limited Force,” pp. 222–23.

32 Vilmer, Jean-Baptiste Jeangène, “A Matter of Balance: A French Perspective on Limited Strikes,” Ethics & International Affairs 34, no. 2 (July, 2020), pp. 201–215Google Scholar.