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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 23 January 2025
In this essay, we bridge the gap between two understandings of the power of the European Union (EU): as a normative actor, guided by ethical principles and empowered by the internal market, and as a geopolitical actor, building its own military capabilities and ready to defend its interests through deterrence and defense. In view of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, we challenge the established “values vs. interests” dichotomy and argue that defending liberal democratic values is an essential foundation of the EU's existing and potential geopolitical power. We show how, over the last decade, opting for short-term expediency and capitulating to a kind of realpolitik “regime indifference” in dealings with authoritarian regimes at home and abroad have severely weakened the EU and also diminished Ukraine's capacities to defend itself as it fights for these shared values on the battlefield. We argue that it is in the EU's strategic interest to strengthen its commitment to values-based foreign and defense policies, revive a meritocratic and credible enlargement process, and work with the United States to provide more effective military assistance to Ukraine in its fight for liberal democratic values and a rules-based European security order.
For comments, insights, and inspiration, we would like to thank Oxana Shevel, Rachel Epstein, Jelena Dzankic, Simonida Kacarska, Hilary Appel, Veronica Anghel, Grigore Pop-Eleches, Chad Bryant, Sophie Meunier, Kateryna Zarembo, Maria Avdeeva, Katarína Mathernová, Maryna Rabinovych, and reviewers and editors at Ethics & International Affairs. We would also like to thank participants of seminars and panels at Princeton University, the Kyiv School of Economics, Harvard University, Kyiv-Mohyla University and the American Political Science Association annual conference. We are grateful for the support of the Carnegie Corporation of New York, the Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, and the Josef Korbel School of International Studies. This research was also supported by a grant from the National Council for Eurasian and East European Research (NCEEER) under authority of a Title VIII grant from the U.S. Department of State. NCEEER, the U.S. Government, and the Ukrainian government are not responsible for the contents of this essay.
1 Ursula von der Leyen quoted in Dan Peleschuk, “EU's von der Leyen visits Kyiv as Russia marks war anniversary, » GMA News Authority May 9, 2023 www.gmanetwork.com/news/topstories/world/869496/eu-s-von-der-leyen-visits-kyiv-as-russia-marks-war-anniversary/story/.
2 Katarína Mathernová (@kmathernova), “I wish . . . and All Ukrainians a Happy 33rd Independence Day! X (Twitter) video, 2:09, August 24, 2024, twitter.com/kmathernova/status/1827227296618430759.
3 Wæver, Ole, “European Security Identities,” Journal of Common Market Studies 34, no. 1 (March 1996), pp. 103–32CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
4 For an overview of this framing in recent scholarship, see Nickel, Carsten, “What Do We Talk about When We Talk about the ‘Return’ of Geopolitics?,” International Affairs 100, no. 1 (January 2024), pp. 221–39CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For an example of this framing in critical geography, see Bialasiewicz, Luiza, “What's ‘Left’ for a ‘Geopolitical Europe’?,” Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers 48, no. 4 (December 2023), pp. 826–31CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
5 Duchêne, François, “Europe's Role in World Peace,” in Mayne, Richard, ed., Europe Tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans Look Ahead (London: Fontana, 1972), pp. 32–47Google Scholar.
6 Manners, Ian, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?,” Journal of Common Market Studies 40, no. 2 (June 2002), pp. 235–58CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
7 Lisbeth Aggestam, “Introduction: Ethical Power Europe?,” International Affairs 84, no. 1 (January 2008), pp. 1–11.
8 This trend was started by Richard G. Whitman, From Civilian Power to Superpower? The International Identity of the European Union (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1998); and Jan Zielonka, Explaining Euro-Paralysis: Why Europe Is Unable to Act in International Politics (Basingstoke, U.K.: Macmillan, 1998).
9 Hylke Dijkstra, “Introduction: One-and-a-Half Cheers for the EU Global Strategy,” Contemporary Security Policy 37, no. 3 (2016), pp. 369–73, at p. 370.
10 Stelios Stavridis, “‘Militarising’ the EU: The Concept of Civilian Power Europe Revisited,” International Spectator 36, no. 4 (October–December 2001), pp. 43–50, at p. 45.
11 “24 May | Salone dei 500—Palazzo Vecchio,” YouTube video, 3:03, from a panel presentation given by Nadiia Koval, “What Vision for the Future of Europe?” at the State of the Union conference in Florence, May 24, 2024, posted by EUI TV, June 26, 2024, www.youtube.com/watch?v=99UnRU086VU.
12 Milada Anna Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration after Communism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
13 The European Parliament, for example, describes the EU's enlargement policy as “the single most effective EU instrument for securing peace, prosperity and fundamental values on the European continent.” Art. 1(b), “European Parliament Recommendation of 23 November 2022 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy concerning the New EU Strategy for Enlargement,” 2022/2064/INI, November 23, 2022.
14 Among EU leaders, the president of the European Parliament, Roberta Metsola, for example, has declared that “Ukraine is Europe. Europe is Ukraine.” The president of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, has declared that Ukraine is “fighting for the ideals of Europe.” Roberta Metsola, quoted in “Ukraine Is Europe,” the President: European Parliament, February 24, 2023, the-president.europarl.europa.eu/home/ep-newsroom/pageContent-area/actualites/ukraine-is-europe.html; and Ursula von der Leyen, quoted in “On Europe Day, President von der Leyen Travels to Kyiv,” European Commission, May 8, 2023, ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ac_23_2692. The commitment to support Ukraine for “as long as it takes” is officially stated on the European Commission website. See “Standing with Ukraine, Every Step of the Way, Solidarity, Resilience, and Commitment to Democratic Principles in the Face of Brutal Invasion,” European Commission, eu-solidarity-ukraine.ec.europa.eu/standing-ukraine-every-step-way_en.
15 In early 2024, the Ukrainian government reported the implementation of 88 percent of the acquis planned for the year 2023, despite the war, and of 77 percent of all the planned EU acquis. See Government Office for Coordination of European and Euro-Atlantic Integration of the Secretariat of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, Report on Implementation of the Association Agreement between Ukraine and the European Union for 2023 (Government of Ukraine, Kyiv, 2024), eu-ua.kmu.gov.ua/wp-content/uploads/Report-on-implementation-of-the-Association-Agreement-between-Ukraine-and-the-European-Union-for-2023.pdf.
16 On a geopolitical EU, see Kristi Raik, Steven Blockmans, Assem Dandashly, Gergana Noutcheva, Anna Osypchuk, and Anton Suslov, “Tackling the Constraints on EU Foreign Policy towards Ukraine: From Strategic Denial to Geopolitical Awakening” (JOINT Research Papers No. 20, European Commission, 2023), cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/137103994/joint_rp_20.pdf.
17 Pierre Vimont, “A New Security Order for Europe” (Schuman Paper No. 733, Fondation Robert Schuman, January 23, 2024), www.robert-schuman.eu/en/european-issues/733-a-new-security-order-for-europe; and Kristi Raik, “The Dream of a European Security Order with Russia Is Dead. How the War Ends Will Determine Europe's Future as Much as Ukraine's,” Foreign Policy, October 31, 2023, foreignpolicy.com/2023/10/31/russia-ukraine-war-europe-security-order-nato-peace-negotiation-settlement/.
18 For details on EU policies in response to Russia's invasion, see Nadiia Koval and Milada Anna Vachudova, “European Union Enlargement and Geopolitical Power in the Face of War,” Journal of Common Market Studies, early view, August 21, 2024, onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jcms.13677.
19 The EU Global Strategy of 2016 could be interpreted as an attempt to “officially” move from an “ethical” to a “pragmatic” foreign and security policy, especially in relations with neighboring countries (calling for building internal “resilience” instead of enlargement) and authoritarian “partners” (applying “principled pragmatism” as an excuse for short-term gains from cooperation with problematic regimes). See Dijkstra, “Introduction,” p. 369. That strategy produced mixed results, in our view, precisely because it is impossible for the EU to reject a values-based approach, as this goes against the nature of the power resources of the EU. We can also interpret it as a minimalistic attempt to close the “capabilities-expectations gap” by lowering expectations. See Kristian L. Nielsen, “EU Soft Power and the Capability-Expectations Gap,” Journal of Contemporary European Research 9, no. 5 (November 2013), pp. 723–39; and Christopher Hill, “The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role,” Journal of Common Market Studies 31, no. 3 (September 1993), pp. 305–28.
20 Niklas Helwig, “The EU's Accidental Geopolitics: Europe's Geopolitical Adaptation and Its Limits” (FIIA Working Paper No. 138, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, May 23, 2024), www.fiia.fi/en/publication/the-eus-accidental-geopolitics; and Richard Youngs, “The Awakening of Geopolitical Europe?,” Carnegie Europe, July 28, 2022, carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/07/the-awakening-of-geopolitical-europe?lang=en¢er=europe.
21 For a list of logical fallacies in numerous peace plans, see Timothy Ash, Annette Bohr, Kateryna Busol, Keir Giles, John Lough, Orysia Lutsevych, James Nixey, James Sherr, Simon Smith, and Kataryna Wolczuk, How to End Russia's War on Ukraine: Safeguarding Europe's Future, and the Dangers of a False Peace (London: Chatham House, updated October 3, 2023), pp. 16–17, www.chathamhouse.org/2023/06/how-end-russias-war-ukraine.
22 Rita Floyd and Mark Webber, “Making Amends: Emotions and the Western Response to Russia's Invasion of Ukraine,” International Affairs 100, no. 3 (May 2024), pp. 1149–69; and Marco Siddi, “The Partnership that Failed: EU-Russia Relations and the War in Ukraine,” Journal of European Integration 44, no. 6 (August 2022), pp. 893–98.
23 On different framings and narratives of the war in 2014–2019 (generated inside academia and think tank communities in Western countries) that facilitated the EU brushing off Russia's annexation of Crimea and invasion of eastern Ukraine, see Nadiia Koval, Volodymyr Kulyk, Mykola Riabchuk, Kateryna Zarembo, and Marianna Fakhurdinova, “Morphological Analysis of Narratives of the Russian-Ukrainian Conflict in Western Academia and Think-Tank Community,” Problems of Post-Communism 69, no. 2 (2022), pp. 166–78.
24 Alvin Camba and Rachel A. Epstein, “From Duterte to Orbán: The Political Economy of Autocratic Hedging,” Journal of International Relations and Development 26, no. 2 (February 2023), pp. 347–72.
25 Gustav Gressel and Majda Ruge, “Germany's Corruption Problem: How to Limit Authoritarian Influence in the EU,” European Council for Foreign Relations, April 20, 2021, ecfr.eu/article/germanys-corruption-scandals-how-to-limit-authoritarian-influence-in-the-eu/. See also Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson, “Why Putin's Pal, Germany's Ex-Chancellor Schroeder, Isn't on a Sanctions List,” National Public Radio, April 18, 2018, www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2018/04/18/601825131/why-putins-pal-germanys-ex-chancellor-hasnt-landed-on-a-sanctions-list.
26 Peter Pomerantsev, “What, Actually, Is Germany's Problem with Russia?,” Zeit Online, February 13, 2022, www.zeit.de/kultur/2022-02/peter-pomerantsev-german-russian-relations-ukraine-conflict; and Timothy Garton Ash, “Big Germany: What Now?,” New York Review of Books, May 23, 2024, www.nybooks.com/articles/2024/05/23/big-germany-what-now-timothy-garton-ash.
27 Olga Burlyuk and Natalia Shapovalova, “‘Veni, Vidi, . . . Vici?’ EU Performance and Two Faces of Conditionality towards Ukraine,” East European Politics 33, no. 1 (2017) pp. 36–55; and Maria Popova and Oxana Shevel, Russia and Ukraine: Entangled Histories, Diverging States (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity, 2024).
28 Raik et al., “Tackling the Constraints on EU Foreign Policy towards Ukraine.”
29 Maryna Rabinovych, “Striving for Trade Not Peace? Revisiting Trade-Peace and Trade-Security Nexuses in the EU's Trade Policy Strategy amidst the Russia-Ukraine War,” Journal of European Integration 45, no. 7 (2023), pp. 1075–98. See also Maryna Rabinovych, “EU's Development Policy vis-à-vis Ukraine after the Euromaidan: Securitisation, State-Building and Integration,” East European Politics 35, no. 3 (2019), pp. 332–50.
30 Oriol Costa and Esther Barbé, “A Moving Target: EU Actorness and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine,” Journal of European Integration 45, no. 3 (2023), pp. 431–46, at p. 432.
31 On how Orbán has dismantled liberal democracy in Hungary despite EU norms and rules, see R. Daniel Kelemen, “Europe's Other Democratic Deficit: National Authoritarianism in Europe's Democratic Union,” in “Democracy without Solidarity: Political Dysfunction in Hard Times,” special issue 2, Government and Opposition 52, no. 2 (April 2017), pp. 211–38; and Milada Anna Vachudova, “Ethnopopulism and Democratic Backsliding in Central Europe,” East European Politics 36, no. 3 (2020), pp. 318–40.
32 For a careful explanation of the reasons why, for a decade, EU leaders and institutions did not counter Orbán's autocratization of Hungary, see R. Daniel Kelemen, “Will the European Union Escape Its Autocracy Trap?,” in “The Multi-Level Politics of Countering Democratic Backsliding,” special issue, Journal of European Public Policy (February 2024), pp. 1–24. See also Hilary Appel, “Can the EU Stop the EU's Illiberal Turn?,” Critical Review 31, nos. 3–4 (August 2019), pp. 255–66.
33 Lise Esther Herman, Julian Hoerner, and Joseph Lacey, “Why Does the European Right Accommodate Backsliding States? An Analysis of 24 European People's Party Votes (2011–2019),” European Political Science Review 13, no. 2 (May 2021), pp. 169–87.
34 On the destruction of liberal democracy by the Fidesz regime and the skewed playing field faced by the opposition, see Zsolt Enyedi, “Right-Wing Authoritarian Innovations in Central and Eastern Europe,” East European Politics 36, no. 3 (2020), pp. 363–77; and Zsuzsanna Szelényi, Tainted Democracy: Viktor Orbán and the Subversion of Hungary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2023).
35 Sophie Meunier and Milada Anna Vachudova, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Illiberalism and the Potential Superpower of the European Union,” in “Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Its Critics,” special issue, Journal of Common Market Studies 56, no. 7 (November 2018), pp. 1631–47.
36 The founding values of the EU are spelled out in general terms in the Treaty on European Union. Article 2 stipulates that “the Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.” Available at eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:12016ME/TXT&from=EN. For more information, see European Union, “Aims and Values,” european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/principles-and-values/aims-and-values_en.
37 Milada Anna Vachudova, “Populism, Democracy, and Party System Change in Europe,” Annual Review of Political Science 24 (May 2021), pp. 471–98, www.annualreviews.org/content/journals/10.1146/annurev-polisci-041719-102711.
38 On similar democratic backsliding by the Law and Justice (PiS) governments in Poland and the EU's response, see Laurent Pech, Patryk Wachowiec, and Dariusz Mazur, “Poland's Rule of Law Breakdown: A Five-Year Assessment of EU's (In)Action,” Hague Journal on the Rule of Law 13 (April 2021), pp. 1–43, link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s40803-021-00151-9.
39 Owing to the results of the June 2024 European Parliament elections, Orbán has succeeded in founding and leading an official far-right “group” in the European Parliament called “Patriots for Europe.” This group, however, does not include key far-right parties, including Italy's ruling Brothers of Italy and Poland's Law and Justice Party (PiS). See Jones Hayden, “Orbán Alliance Gains Enough Support to be EU Parliament Group,” POLITICO, July 7, 2024, www.politico.eu/article/orbans-patriots-for-europe-gains-enough-support-to-be-european-parliament-group/.
40 On the playbook of Europe's ethnopopulist parties for winning votes and concentrating power, see Vachudova, “Ethnopopulism and Democratic Backsliding in Central Europe.”
41 Liesbet Hooghe, Gary Marks, Ryan Bakker, Seth Jolly, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Marco Steenbergen, and Milada Anna Vachudova, “The Russian Threat and the Consolidation of the West: How Populism and EU-Skepticism Shape Party Support for Ukraine,” European Union Politics 25, no. 3 (September 2024), pp. 459–623, journals.sagepub.com/doi/epub/10.1177/14651165241237136.
42 Mitchell A. Orenstein and R. Daniel Kelemen. “Trojan Horses in EU Foreign Policy,” Journal of Common Market Studies 55, no. 1 (January 2017), pp. 87–102; and Meunier and Vachudova, “Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Illiberalism and the Potential Superpower of the European Union.” See also Heidi Przybyla and Nicholas Vinocur, “Former GOP Officials Sound Alarm over Trump's Orbán Embrace: Groups Seeking the Former President's Favor Have Highlighted Pro-Russian Hungarian Leaders and Talking Points,” POLITICO, September 1, 2024, www.politico.com/news/2024/09/01/trump-orban-embrace-00176832.
43 For different instances of Hungary blackmailing the EU, see Jorge Liboreiro, “Ukraine Heading for Accession Impasse during Hungary's EU Presidency,” Euronews, June 18, 2024, www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/06/18/ukraine-heading-for-accession-impasse-during-hungarys-eu-council-presidency; Jacopo Barigazzi, “EU Ministers Fume as ‘Outrageous’ Hungary Yet Again Blocks Military Aid for Ukraine,” POLITICO, May 27, 2024, www.politico.eu/article/eu-ministers-outrageous-hungary-blocks-military-aid-arms-ukraine; Nicolas Camut, “Commission Unblocks €10.2B for Hungary as EU Tries to Sway Viktor Orbán on Ukraine,” POLITICO, December 13, 2023, www.politico.eu/article/commission-unblocks-e10-2-billion-for-hungary-as-eu-tries-to-sway-viktor-orban-on-ukraine/; Henry Foy, “Why Hungary Is Again Blocking the Latest Round of Russia Sanctions,” Financial Times, February 14, 2024, www.ft.com/content/53f2e696-5ff2-4be9-bcf0-f6a144fbdbff; Rikard Jozwiak, “Hungary Looks to Remove Nine People from EU Sanctions List Imposed in Wake of Russia Invasion of Ukraine,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, January 17, 2023, www.rferl.org/a/hungary-eu-sanctions-list-russia-ukraine/32227730.html; Emily Rauhala and Beatriz Rios, “With Hungary Blocking Ukraine Aid, E.U. Desperate for Workarounds,” Washington Post, January 31, 2024, www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/01/31/eu-summit-hungary-orban-ukraine/; Andrzej Sadecki, “Orbán's Blackmail: Hungary Threatens to Block Ukraine's Integration with the EU,” OSW Centre for Eastern Studies, December 5, 2023, www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2023-12-05/orbans-blackmail-hungary-threatens-to-block-ukraines-integration-eu.
44 Jorge Liboreiro, “European Commission Boycotts Hungarian Presidency over Orbán's Trips to Moscow and Beijing,” Euronews, July 15, 2024, www.euronews.com/my-europe/2024/07/15/european-commission-will-boycott-hungarian-presidency-over-orbans-trips-to-moscow-and-beij; and Andrew Rettman, “EU Boycott Widening, as Orbán Calls for Putin Talks,” EUobserver, July 16, 2024, euobserver.com/eu-and-the-world/ar257c9f61.
45 Patrick Müller and Peter Slominski, “Hungary, the EU and Russia's War against Ukraine: The Changing Dynamics of EU Foreign Policymaking,” in Claudia Wiesner and Michèle Knodt, eds., The War against Ukraine and the EU: Facing New Realities (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan), pp. 111–32, link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-35040-5_6.
46 Elena Sánchez Nicolás, “Frustration and Gloom with Orbán ahead of Ukraine Summit,” EUobserver, January 30, 2024, euobserver.com/eu-political/158003.
47 For an analysis of why this may remain unlikely, see Appel, “Can the EU Stop the EU's Illiberal Turn?”; and Kelemen, “Will the European Union Escape its Autocracy Trap?”
48 Rachel A. Epstein, “The Economic Successes and Sources of Discontent in East Central Europe,” Canadian Journal of European and Russian Studies 13, no. 2 (June 2020), pp. 1–19.
49 Jelena Džankić, Soeren Keil, and Marko Kmezić, eds., The Europeanisation of the Western Balkans: A Failure of EU Conditionality? (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).
50 Jelena Džankić, Simonida Kacarska, and Soeren Keil, eds., A Year Later: War in Ukraine and Western Balkan (Geo)Politics (San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute, 2023).
51 Vachudova, Europe Undivided.
52 Antoaneta Dimitrova and Elitsa Kortenska, “Enlargement as Foreign Policy in the Western Balkans: Has it Reached Its Limits?,” in Bernard Steunenberg, Wim Voermans, and Stefaan Van den Bogaert, eds., Fit for the Future? Reflections from Leiden on the Functioning of the EU (Hague: Eleven International Publishing, 2016), pp. 265–90.
53 Simonida Kacarska and Ardita Abazi Imeri, “Effective Benchmarking for Concrete Rule of Law Reforms in the Western Balkans” (Belgrade: Think for Europe Network, October 2019), cep.org.rs/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Effective-benchmarking-for-concrete-rule-of-law-reforms-in-the-Western-Balkans.pdf. See also Wouter Zweers, Giulia Cretti, Myrthe de Boon, Alban Dafa, Strahinja Subotić, Milena Muk, Arber Fetahu, Ardita Abazi Imeri, Emina Kuhinja, and Hata Kujraković, The EU as a Promoter of Democracy or ‘Stabilitocracy’ in the Western Balkans (Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael,” February 2022), www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2022-02/the-eu-as-a-promoter-of-democracy-or-stabilitocracy.pdf.
54 For a discussion on how to measure the progress and completion of these “fundamentals,” see Marko Kmezic, Viktoriia Melnyk, and Roman Smaliuk, “How to Upgrade EU Benchmarking in Fundamentals: The Case of Judicial Reform in Ukraine” (Kyiv: Ukrainian Centre for European Policy, 2024), pravo.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/how-to-upgrade-eu-benchmarking-in-fundamentals-the-case-of-judicial-reform-in-ukraine_web.pdf.
55 On Orbán's concentration of power in Hungary, see Kim Lane Scheppele, “How Viktor Orbán Wins,” Journal of Democracy 33, no. 3 (July 2022), pp. 45–61; and Péter Krekó and Zsolt Enyedi, “Orbán's Laboratory of Illiberalism,” Journal of Democracy 29, no. 3 (July 2018), pp. 39–51.
56 On mobilization in defense of liberal democracy, see Milada Anna Vachudova, Danijela Dolenec, and Adam Fagan, “Civic Mobilization against Democratic Backsliding in Post-Communist Europe,” East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures, early view (May 2024), journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/08883254231218466; and Antoaneta L. Dimitrova, “The Uncertain Road to Sustainable Democracy: Elite Coalitions, Citizen Protests and the Prospects of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe,” East European Politics 34, no. 3 (2018), pp. 257–75.
57 Courtney Blackington, Antoaneta L. Dimitrova, Iulia Ionita, and Milada Anna Vachudova, “Mobilizing against Democratic Backsliding: What Motivates Protesters in Central and Eastern Europe?,” East European Politics and Societies: and Cultures, early view (May 2024), journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/08883254231212489.
58 Vachudova, “Populism, Democracy, and Party System Change in Europe.”
59 Molly Krasnodębska, Politics of Stigmatization: Poland as a ‘Latecomer’ in the European Union (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021).
60 Vachudova, Europe Undivided.
61 Jens Stoltenberg, “NATO Secretary General's Statement on the Second Anniversary of Russia's Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine” (statement, February 24, 2024), www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_223084.htm. A couple of months later, in Kyiv, Stoltenberg declared that “Ukraine's rightful place is in NATO. Ukraine's future is in NATO. And Ukraine will become a member of NATO.” Jens Stoltenberg, “Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg at the Verkhovna Rada in Ukraine” (speech, April 29, 2024), www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_225153.htm.
62 Mykhailo Soldatenko, “Getting Ukraine's Security Agreements Right,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 8, 2024, carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/07/getting-ukraines-security-agreements-right?lang=en.
63 European Council, “Joint Security Commitments between the European Union and Ukraine,” June 27, 2024, www.consilium.europa.eu/media/oredhmis/eu-ukraine-security-commitments-en.pdf.
64 Pierre Haroche, What Security Guarantees Can the EU Provide to Ukraine? (Paris: Institut Jacques Delors, March 2023), institutdelors.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/Decryptage_Europe_qui_protege_Garanties_securite_europeenne_Ukraine_Haroche_EN.pdf.
65 European Council, “Joint Security Commitments between the European Union and Ukraine,” p. 7.
66 Olga Onuch, “Ukrainians’ Unwavering Path Toward the EU,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 13, 2024, carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/06/ukrainians-unwavering-path-toward-the-eu?lang=en.
67 Among Ukrainians, there is a strong consensus about the meaning of European integration for the country's future. Data collected by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in February 2023 shows that 82 percent of the respondents agreed that the future of Ukraine depends on its European integration. As to the meaning of the EU integration, Ukrainians in October 2023 linked it to long-term security (59 percent), economic perspectives (57 percent), the future of democracy in Ukraine (44 percent), and securing the rule of law (45 percent). On the correlation between support for EU membership and readiness to fight in the war, see Oleksandr Reznik, “Ukrainians’ European Integration Aspirations: From Ambivalence to Expression,” Democratic Initiatives Foundation, September 9, 2022, dif.org.ua/article/ukrainians-european-integration-aspirations-from-ambivalence-to-expression.
68 Ivan Gomza and Nadiia Koval, “The Winter of Our Discontent: Emotions and Contentious Politics in Ukraine during Euromaidan,” Kyiv-Mohyla Law and Politics Journal, no. 1 (2015), pp. 39–62, kmlpj.ukma.edu.ua/article/view/52673.
69 On the use of values in justifying Russian foreign policy goals, see Mikhail Suslov, “A More Just World Order” in the Regime Ideology of Putinism,” in Ninna Mörner (ed.) A World Order in Transformation? A Comparative Study of Consequences of the War and Reactions to these Changes in the Region (Stockholm: CBEES, 2024), pp. 15–22, sh.diva-portal.org/smash/get/diva2:1846696/FULLTEXT01.pdf. On the consolidation of Russia's ideology after 2022, see Marlène Laruelle, Russia's Ideological Construction in the Context of the War in Ukraine, Russie.Eurasie.Reports No. 46 (Paris: French Institute of International Relations, 2024), www.defense.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/dgris/Etude%20de%20fond%20n%C2%B010%20-%20Russia%E2%80%99s%20ideological%20construction%20in%20the%20context%20of%20the%20war%20in%20Ukraine.pdf.
70 The Russian Federation's foreign policy concept for 2023 sets out Russia's foreign policy priorities, including the priority “to consolidate international efforts to ensure respect for and protection of universal and traditional spiritual and moral values . . . and counter the attempts to impose pseudo-humanistic or other neo-liberal ideological views, leading to the loss by humankind of traditional spiritual and moral values and integrity.” See “The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, March 31, 2023, www.mid.ru/ru/detail-material-page/1860586/?lang=en&ysclid=lt2wsrygyb374383685.
71 Michael McFaul and Robert Person, “What Putin Fears Most,” Horizons: Journal of International Relations and Sustainable Development, no. 21 (Summer 2022), pp. 28–39, www.jstor.org/stable/48686694.
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