Published online by Cambridge University Press: 08 July 2020
“Civilization” is back at the forefront of global policy debates. The leaders of rising powers such as China, India, Turkey, and Russia have stressed their civilizational identity in framing their domestic and foreign policy platforms. An emphasis on civilizational identity is also evident in U.S. president Donald Trump's domestic and foreign policy. Some analysts argue that the twenty-first century might belong to the civilization state, just as the past few centuries were dominated by the nation-state. But is the rise of civilization state inevitable? Will it further undermine the liberal international order and fuel a clash of civilizations, as predicted by the late Samuel Huntington? Or might ideas from East Asian and other non-Western civilizations contribute to greater pluralism in our thinking about world order and the study of international relations?
1 Donald Trump, quoted in Glenn Thrush and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “Trump, in Poland, Asks If West Has the ‘Will to Survive,’” New York Times, July 6, 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/world/europe/donald-trump-poland-speech.html.
2 Kiron Skinner, quoted in Joel Gehrke, “State Department Preparing for Clash of Civilizations with China,” Washington Examiner, April 30, 2019, www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/state-department-preparing-for-clash-of-civilizations-with-china.
3 Xi Jinping, quoted in “Chinese President Xi Jinping Says ‘No Clash’ of Civilisations amid US Trade War,” CNA, May 15, 2019, www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/china-xi-jinping-speech-us-trade-war-11535130.
4 Xi Jinping, quoted in ibid.
5 See, for example, Narendra Modi, “Prime Minister's Keynote Address at Shangri La Dialogue (June 01, 2018),” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime_Ministers_Keynote_Address_at_Shangri_La_Dialogue_June_01_2018; and Rupam Jain and Tom Lasseter, “By Rewriting History, Hindu Nationalists Aim to Assert Their Dominance over India,” Reuters, March 6, 2018, www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/india-modi-culture/.
6 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, quoted in Borzou Daragahi, “How the New Zealand Terror Attack Has Become a Key Factor in Turkey's Upcoming Elections,” Independent, March 19, 2019, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/new-zealand-terror-attack-turkey-elections-erdogan-christchurch-mosques-islam-crusades-a8828396.html.
7 Gideon Rachman, “China, India and the Rise of the ‘Civilisation State,’” Financial Times, March 4, 2019, www.ft.com/content/b6bc9ac2-3e5b-11e9-9bee-efab61506f44. See also James M. Dorsey, “Civilizationism vs the Nation State,” Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer (blog), March 24, 2019, mideastsoccer.blogspot.com/2019/03/civilizationism-vs-nation-state.html.
8 Coker, Christopher, The Rise of the Civilizational State (Cambridge, U.K.: Polity, 2019), pp. xi–xiiGoogle Scholar.
9 Huntington, Samuel P., “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 1993), p. 22CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Huntington subsequently developed his thesis into a book: Huntington, Samuel P., The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996)Google Scholar. For my earlier critiques of Huntington, see Amitav Acharya, “Clash of Civilizations? No, of National Interests and Principles,” International Herald Tribune, reprinted, New York Times, January 10, 2002, www.nytimes.com/2002/01/10/opinion/IHT-clash-of-civilizationsno-of-national-interests-and-principles.html; and Amitav Acharya, “How the Two Big Ideas of the Post-Cold War Era Failed,” MonkeyCage, Washington Post, June 24, 2015, www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/06/24/how-the-two-big-ideas-of-the-post-cold-war-era-failed/.
10 Mark Beeson, “Play It Again, Sam,” Conversation, August 15, 2014, theconversation.com/play-it-again-sam-30588; and Joshua R. Fattal, “Israel vs. Hamas: A Clash of Civilizations?,” HuffPost, August 22, 2014, www.huffingtonpost.com/joshua-r-fattal/israel-vs-hamas-a-clash-o_b_5699216.html.
11 Ajami, Fouad, “The Summoning: ‘But They Said, We Will Not Hearken,’” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 4 (September/October 1993), pp. 2–9CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Binyan, Liu, “Civilization Grafting: No Culture Is an Island,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 4 (September/October 1993), pp. 19–21CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
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13 Frederick J. Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History (1893),” American Historical Association, www.historians.org/about-aha-and-membership/aha-history-and-archives/historical-archives/the-significance-of-the-frontier-in-american-history.
14 Adrian Pabst, “China, Russia and the Return of the Civilisational State,” NewStatesman, May 8, 2019, www.newstatesman.com/2019/05/china-russia-and-return-civilisational-state.
15 Cristian Violatti, “Arthashastra,” in Ancient History Encyclopedia online, April 6, 2014, www.ancient.eu/Arthashastra/.
16 Nehru, Jawaharlal, Soviet Russia: Some Random Sketches and Impressions (Mumbai: Chetana, 1929), p. 2Google Scholar, ignca.gov.in/Asi_data/742.pdf.
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19 Pye, Lucian W., “China: Erratic State, Frustrated Society,” Foreign Affairs 69, no. 4 (Fall 1990), p. 58CrossRefGoogle Scholar. The view of China as a civilization state has also been echoed by other writers. See Harold Sheffery, “Understanding China and Its Rise: The ‘Civilization-State,’” Asia Society, July 31, 2012, asiasociety.org/india/understanding-china-and-its-rise-civilization-state.
20 Yat-sen, Sun, China and Japan: Natural Friends, Unnatural Enemies; A Guide for China's Foreign Policy (Shanghai: China United, 1941), p. 15Google Scholar.
21 Zhao Tingyang, “Can This Ancient Chinese Philosophy Save Us from Global Chaos?,” Washington Post (blog), February 7, 2018, www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/wp/2018/02/07/tianxia/. Zhao is the chief advocate of tianxia. See also Tingyang, Zhao, “A Political World Philosophy in Terms of All-Under-Heaven (Tian-Xia),” Diogenes 56, no. 1 (February 2009), pp. 5–18CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For a critique, see Zhang Feng, “The Tianxia System: World Order in a Chinese Utopia,” China Heritage Quarterly 21 (March 2010), www.chinaheritagequarterly.org/tien-hsia.php?searchterm=021_utopia.inc&issue=021.
22 Cemil Aydin, “What is the Muslim World?,” Aeon, August 1, 2018, aeon.co/amp/essays/the-idea-of-a-muslim-world-is-both-modern-and-misleading?
23 Acharya, “How the Two Big Ideas of the Post-Cold War Era Failed.”
24 John Turner, “Islam as a Theory of International Relations?,” Students, E-International Relations, August 3, 2009, www.e-ir.info/2009/08/03/islam-as-a-theory-of-international-relations/.
25 “Mustafa Kemal Atatürk,” Columbia University in the City of New York, January 12, 1994, www.columbia.edu/~sss31/Turkiye/ata/hayati.html.
26 Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, quoted in Yücel Bozdağlıoğlu, “Modernity, Identity and Turkey's Foreign Policy,” Insight Turkey 10, no. 1, (2008), p. 62. https://www.academia.edu/2487657/Modernity_Identity_and_Turkeys_Foreign_Policy.
27 Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, quoted in Ian Black, “Turkey Must Be Kept Out of the Union, Giscard Says,” Guardian, November 9, 2002, www.theguardian.com/world/2002/nov/09/turkey.eu.
28 Recep Tayyip Erdo[ğ]an, quoted in Sabrina Tavernise, “A Rumble Is Heard in Ataturk's Grave,” New York Times, May 20, 2007, www.nytimes.com/2007/05/20/weekinreview/20tavernise.html.
29 Barack Obama, quoted in Steve Holland and Margaret Chadbourn, “Obama Describes Putin as ‘like a Bored Kid,’” Reuters, August 9, 2013, www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-russia-obama-idUSBRE9780XS20130809. See also “Putin's Plan to Restore Russia: The Disruptive Power of Moscow,” On Point, WBUR, February 25, 2019, www.wbur.org/onpoint/2019/02/25/putins-plan-to-restore-russia-the-disruptive-power-of-moscow.
30 Areg Galstyan, “Third Rome Rising: The Ideologues Calling for a New Russian Empire,” National Interest, June 27, 2016, nationalinterest.org/feature/third-rome-rising-the-ideologues-calling-new-russian-empire-16748.
31 Ian Bremmer, “The Mixed Fortunes of the BRICS Countries, in 5 Facts,” TIME, September 1, 2017, time.com/4923837/brics-summit-xiamen-mixed-fortunes/.
32 World Bank Global Macroeconomics Team, “Global Weekly: Sources of the Growth Slowdown in BRICS,” January 11, 2016, cited in Acharya, Amitav, “After Liberal Hegemony: The Advent of a Multiplex World,” Ethics & International Affairs 31, no. 3 (Fall 2017)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
33 Bremmer, “Mixed Fortunes of the BRICS Countries”; and Carol Matlack, “Russia's Great Shift Downward: Putin Has Shown Little Interest in Changing the Economic Model,” Bloomberg Businessweek, January 28, 2016, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-01-28/russia-s-economy-faces-long-term-decline.
34 World Bank Group, Modest Growth; Focus on Informality, Russia Economic Report 41 (Washington, D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, June 2019), pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/115001560108403019/rer-41-english.pdf.
35 Acharya, Amitav, “Why International Ethics Will Survive the Crisis of the Liberal International Order,” SAIS Review of International Affairs 39, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2019), p. 12CrossRefGoogle Scholar.
36 “Countries and Regions: Turkey,” European Commission, January 22, 2020, europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/turkey/.
37 Storbeck, Doreen, “Indian Labour Migration to the Arab Gulf States: The Impact of a Growing Interdependence,” Internationales Asienforum 42, nos. 1/2 (2011), p. 21Google Scholar; and Phillip Connor, “India Is a Top Source and Destination for World's Migrants,” Fact Tank, Pew Research Center, March 3, 2017, www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/03/india-is-a-top-source-and-destination-for-worlds-migrants/.
38 Bilai Kuchay, “Why Have Saudi Arabia, UAE Failed to Condemn India over Kashmir?,” Al Jazeera, September 12, 2019, www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/saudi-arabia-uae-failed-condemn-india-kashmir-190911112648176.html.
39 Erdoğan Foreign Ministry, quoted in Ben Westcott and Isil Sariyuce, “Erdogan Says Xinjiang Camps Shouldn't Spoil Turkey-China Relationship,” July 5, 2019, World, CNN, www.cnn.com/2019/07/05/asia/turkey-china-uyghur-erdogan-intl-hnk/index.html.
40 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, quoted in ibid.
41 Imran Khan, quoted in ibid.
42 Shah Mehmood Qureshi, quoted in Alexandra Ma, “A Wave of Islamic Countries Started to Stand Up to China over Its Persecution of Its Muslim Minority. But Then They All Got Spooked,” Business Insider, April 6, 2019, www.businessinsider.com/islamic-world-stopped-calling-out-chinas-muslim-persecution-2019-4. Rhea Mahbubani, “Pakistani Leader Imran Khan Admitted He Refuses to Criticize China's Treatment of Its Uighur Minority Because They ‘Helped Us When We Were at Rock Bottom,’” Business Insider, January 22, 2020, https://www.businessinsider.com/imran-khan-pakistan-wont-criticize-china-on-uighurs-2020-1.
44 Wang Yi, quoted in Zhenhua Lu, “China–Russia Relations Are Unrivalled, Beijing Warns before US’ Mike Pompeo Meets Vladimir Putin,” South China Morning Post, May 14, 2019, www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3010185/china-russia-relations-are-unrivalled-beijing-warns-us-mike.
45 Dan Coats, quoted in James Dobbins, Howard J. Shatz, and Ali Wyne, “A Warming Trend in China-Russia Relations,” Rand Blog, April 18, 2019, www.rand.org/blog/2019/04/a-warming-trend-in-china-russia-relations.html.
46 Ibid.
47 Acharya, “After Liberal Hegemony” pp. 271–85. For an opposing view on the prospects of the liberal order, see Ikenberry, G. John, “Why the Liberal Order Will Survive,” Ethics & International Affairs 32, no. 1 (Spring 2018), pp. 17–29CrossRefGoogle Scholar. My argument is not that the U.S.-led liberal order will completely disappear, but that it will survive in parts, or in “rump,” while losing its hegemonic position, and will have to compete with other types of international orders.