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The Collective Enforcement of International Norms Through Economic Sanctions1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2012

Lori Fisler Damrosch
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Extract

A recent front-page story in the New York Times—“Study Says Haiti Sanctions Kill Up to a 1,000 Children a Month”—draws attention to a vexing ethical problem: Under what circumstances can it be morally justifiable for the international community to apply economic sanctions that wreak serious hardship on civilians in the target state? Even though follow-up reports suggested that the headline might have to overstated the damage actually attributable to the Haitian sanctions, there can be little doubt that current sanctions programs entail at least the potential for a severe degree of civilian harm, to the point of triggering difficult moral issues.

Type
Articles
Information
Ethics & International Affairs , Volume 8 , March 1994 , pp. 59 - 75
Copyright
Copyright © Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs 1994

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References

2 Howard W. French. “Study Says Haiti Sanctions Kill Up to 1,000 Children a Month,”New York Times, November 9, 1993. Al

3 In a letter to the editor, two authors ot the study called the Times headline misleading: “We do not attribute all human damage to sanctions, hut noted that sanctions have exacerbated a complex crisis.” Lincoln C. Chen and Winifred M. Fízgerald, “Haítiaans Suffer With and Without Sanctions,”New York Times, November 16. 1993. A26 See also Howard W. French, “Doctors Question Haiti Health Data: Find Raws in Projection that Embargo is Causing 1,000 Infant De.ubs a Month.”New York Times, November 24. 1993. A12.

4 For discussion of factors bearing on the willingness of states to join with others in imposing sanctions, see Lisa Martin. Coercive Cooperation (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press 1992).

5 S.C. Res. 660 (August 2, 1990) condemned the invasion by a vote of 14–0 (Yemen not participating); and S.C. Res. 661 (August 6, 1990) imposed mandatory economic sanctions by a vote of 13–0 (Cuba and Yemen abstaining).

6 See, for example, Gaty Huthauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott. Economic Sactions Keeonsidered, 2nd ed. (Washington: Institute of International Economics 1990.

7 See, for example, David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985).

8 Martin, Coercive Cooperation.

9 This point is deat with in Damrosch, “Concluding Reflictions.”in Enforcing Restraint 361–63.

10 This suggestionon is explored in more detail in Damroseh. “Civilian Impact.Enforcing Restraint 284–91).

11 That proposition is itself a contested one that would take us beyond the scope of this article.

12 In addition to the Iraq, Yugoslav, and Haitian sanctions programs under discussion here, the Libyan sanctions seek to enforce norms against international terrorism. United Nations—mandated arms embargoes with respect to Somalia, Liberia, and Angola, in support of the objective of mitigating civil strife, also have enforcement purposes (for example, to induce the warring factions to comply with previous agreements for cease-fires, disarmament, and/or political settlement).

13 The study by Hufbauer et al. catalogues approximately one hundred sanctions episodes, illustrating diverse policy aims (such as obtaining compensation for expropriated property, bringing down a government, or discouraging participation in a hostile alliance).

14 The example of Iraq illustrates the point on the deployment of weapons of mass destruction.

15 Paul Lewis, “U.S. and Britain Softening Emphasis on Ousting Iraqi,”New York Times, March 30, 1993. A3.

16 Judgment of the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, September 30, 1946, reprinted in American Journal of International Law 41 (1947), 186Google Scholar.

17 Article 2(4) of the UN Charter provides: “AH Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” On “Definition of Aggression,” see G.A. Res. 3314 (1974), G.A. Official Records, 29th Sess., Supp. 31, at 42.

18 S.C Res. 661 (August 6, 1990); S.C. Res. 678 (November 29, 1990). In S.C. Res. 665 (August 25, 1990), the Council had authorized the use of maritime forces to enforce the economic sanctions.

19 Compare the Council's response to North Korea's invasion of South Korea on June 25, 1950; S.C. Res. 82, 83, 84 (June 25 and 27, and July 7, 1950) (armed attack constitutes “breach of the peace”).

20 S.C. Res. 687 (April 3, 1991), Part F, para. 22.

21 Paul Lewis, “U.S. Won't Discuss Embargo Terms With Iraq,”New York Times, November 28, 1993, A16.

22 For documcntation in chilling detail, sec Middle East Watch, Genocide in Iraq: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds (New York: Human Rights Watch. 1993)

23 On the Genocide Convention, sec Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. UN Treats Series 78 (December 9, 1948), 277Google Scholar. On Iraq's acceptance see Multilateral Treaties Deposited With the Secretary-General as at 31 December 1992 (New York: United Nations, 1993). 91.

24 See, for example, Chris Hedges, “In a Remote Southern Marsh. Iraq is Strangling The Shiites,”New York Tunes. November 16. 1993, Al.

25 The Council has stopped short of characterizing Iraq's actions as genoeidal. In Resolution 68S (April 5. 1991). it “[condernned] the repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts ol Iraq, including most recently in Kurdish populated areas.” For discussion of Resolution 688 see Jane Stromseth. “Iraq's Repression of Its Civilian Population: Collective Responses and Continuing Challenges,” in Damrosch, ed. Enforcing Restraint.

26 For three formulations of moral criteria for evaluating absolute and relative impact on civilians and wrongdoers, see Damrosch, “Civilian Impact,” 281–84.

27 More precisely, to the Republic of Croatia and to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

28 In S.C. Res. 662 (August 9, 1990), the Council had decided that Iraq's annexation of Kuwait “has no legal validity, and is considered null and void,” and called for universal nonrecognition of that annexation.

29 S.C. Res. 713 (September 25, 1991) (preamble) (emphasis added to phrase “within Yugoslavia”).

30 On sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence, see, for example, S.C. Res. 770 (August 13, 1992), S.C. Res. 819 (April 16, 1993), S.C. Res. 824 (May 6, 1993), S.C. Res. 836 (June 4, 1993); on the treatment of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a “State Member of the United Nations,” see, for example, S.C. Res. 787 (November 16, 1992).

31 The three quotations, respectively, are taken from S.C. Res. 752 (May 15, 1992). para. 1: S.C Res. 757 (May 30, 1992); and S.C. Res. 787 (November 16. 1992). para. 2 To similar effect. see S.C. Res. 815 (March 30. 1993). para, 5 (territorial integrity of Croatia;; S.C. Rev 819” (April 16. 1993). S.C. Res. 820 (April 17, 1993); S.C. Res. 824 (May 6. 1993), para. 2: S.C. Res. 836 (June 4, 1993); S.C. Res. 859 (August 24, 1993).

32 S.C. Rev 713 (September 25, 1991); for reaffimation that the embargo continues to apply to all of the former Yugoslavia, see, f'or example, S.C. Res. 762 (June 30. 1992). para 8 In June of 1993, by a vote of six in favor and nine abstentions, the Council failed to adopt a resolution that would have lifted the arms embargo as applied to Bosnia (nine affirmative votes are required to pass a measure under Article 27 of the Charter). Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3247th Meeting. UN Doe. S/PV.3247 (June 29. 1993), 148.

33 Damrosch, “Civilian Impact,” 291, 301.

34 S.C. Res. 757 (May 30, 1992); see also S.C. Res. 787 (November 16, 1992).

35 Case Concerning Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia [Serbia and Montenegro]), Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, ICJ Reports 1993, Orders of April 8 and September 13, 1993.

36 S.C. Res. 819 (April 16, 1993).

37 See Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

38 S.C. Res. 827 (May 25, 1993).

39 In S.C Res. 820 April 17,1993). the Council expanded the sanctions in an effort to pressure the Bosnian Serbs io accept the peace plan that had been accepted by the other two Bosnian parties.

40 See, for example, S.C Res. 820 (April 17 1993). drawing specllic attention io to in Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) and the Bosnian Serb party ot various prior Council resolutions.

41 John Kilner. “Croatia Threatens Direct Military Intervention in Bosnian Fighting, New Yory Times, January 3.1993, A8 Both the united Nations and the European Union have warned that same tions would swiftly follow Croatian military action”!

44 Franck, Thomas M.. “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance.” American Journal of International Law 86 (1992). 46CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

45 The Charter of the Organition of American States. Article 50d. alfirms the priniciple of The effective exercise oí representative democracy” see also the Santiago Declaration on Representative Democracy. OAS Doc AG/RHS. 1080(XXI-0/91). June5 1991.

44 S.C. Res. 841 (June 16, 1993).

45 Provisional Verbatim Record of the 3238th Meeting, UN Doc. S/PV.3238 (June 16, 1993).

46 S/PV.3238; see also S.C. Res. 841, preamble.

47 “UN Economic Curbs on Pretoria Arc Lifted,”New York Times, October M, IW3. A8 (reporting General Assembly vote calling for an end to South African sanctions following Nelson Mandela's UN speech endorsing that approach).

48 “Authentic” refers to those with a hona fide claim to authority to speak for their people, whether or not they have ever been allowed to run for office (Mandela) and whether they are on the scene or in exile (Aristide).

49 “Civilian Impact,” 300–1.

50 For references, see Damrosch, “The Civilian Impact of Economic Sanctions,” 295, 313 (note 59).

51 See Damrosch, “Civilian Impact,” 297–99, and “Concluding Reflections,” 354.

52 Damrosch, “Civilian Impact,” 298; see also R. W. Apple, Jr., “In Shift, U.S. Plans to Limit Penalties to Rulers in Haiti,”New York Times, November 2, 1993, Al.

53 See, for example, “As Sanctions Bite, Haiti's Poor Feel the Pinch,”New York Times, November 15, 1993, A7.