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Whither the Responsibility to Protect? Humanitarian Intervention and the 2005 World Summit

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2011

Alex J. Bellamy
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Abstract

At the 2005 World Summit, the world‘s leaders committed themselves to the “responsibility to protect”, recognizing both that all states have a responsibility to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and that the UN should help states to discharge this responsibility using either peaceful means or enforcement action. This declaration ostensibly marks an important milestone in the relationship between sovereignty and human rights but its critics argue that it will make little difference in practice to the world’s most threatened people. The purpose of this article is to ask how consensus was reached on the responsibility to protect, given continuing hostility to humanitarian intervention expressed by many (if not most) of the world‘s states and whether the consensus will contribute to avoiding future Kosovos (cases where the Security Council is deadlocked in the face of a humanitarian crises) and future Rwandas (cases where states lack the political will to intervene). It suggests that four key factors contributed to the consensus: pressure from proponents of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, its adoption by Kofi Annan and the UN’s High Level Panel, an emerging consensus in the African Union, and the American position. Whilst these four factors contributed to consensus, each altered the meaning of the responsibility to protect in important ways, creating a doctrine that many states can sign up to but that does little to prevent future Kosovos and Rwandas and may actually inhibit attempts to build a consensus around intervention in future cases.

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Articles
Information
Ethics & International Affairs , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , June 2006 , pp. 143 - 169
Copyright
Copyright © Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs 2006

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References

1 Kofi Annan, “Two Concepts of Sovereignty,” Economist, September 18, 1999, p. 49.

2 Nicholas J. Wheeler, “A Victory for Common Humanity? The Responsibility to Protect after the 2005 World Summit” (paper presented to a conference on “The UN at Sixty: Celebration or Wake?” Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, October 6–7, 2005), p. 1.

3 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (Ottawa: ICISS, 2001), para. 2.30.

4 Throughout this article, “the responsibility to protect” refers to the concept and The Responsibility to Protect to the ICISS report.

5 UNGA, “2005 Summit Outcome,” A/60/L.1, September 20, 2005, paras. 138–39; available at http:\\daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N05/511/30/PDF/N0551130.pdf?OpenElement.

6 Todd Lindberg, “Protect the People,” Washington Times, September 27, 2005; available at http:\\washingtontimes.com/op-ed/20050926-092335-2083r.htm.

7 Michael Byers, “High Ground Lost on UN’s Responsibility to Protect,” Winnipeg Free Press, September 18, 2005, p. B3.

8 The idea of distinguishing between the prescriptive and permissive elements of the humanitarian intervention norm was suggested to the author by Luke Glanville.

9 Simon Chesterman, Just War or Just Peace? Humanitarian Intervention and International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

10 Or, more normally, a combination of the two. See Nicholas J. Wheeler, Saving Strangers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); and Michael Walzer, “The Argument about Humanitarian Intervention,” Dissent 49, no. 1 (Winter 2002), pp. 29–37; available at http:\\www.pol.uiuc.edu/alumni/XTRACLINE%5CDissent%20Magazine%20-%20Winter%202002.htm.

11 Especially Christian Reus-Smit, American Power and World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005).

12 On implied authorization, see Michael Byers, War Law (London: Atlantic Books, 2005), pp. 40–50.

13 Lloyd Axworthy, Gareth Evans, and Ramesh Thakur. See “Responsibility to Protect: Redefining Sovereignty,” MacArthur Newsletter (Summer 2005), p. 9. I am grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for bringing this to my attention.

14 The importance of generating political will was understood at the outset by the ICISS commissioners. See Gareth Evans and Mohamed Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 6 (2002), pp. 99–110.

15 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, paras. 6.19–6.21. ICISS (para. 6.21) reported that this proposal was presented to the Commission “in an exploratory way by a senior representative of one of the Permanent Five Countries.”

16 Nicholas J. Wheeler, “Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention: Principles and Procedures,” Melbourne Journal of International Law 2, no. 2 (2001), p. 566.

17 Thomas M. Franck and Nigel S. Rodley, “After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force,” American Journal of International Law 67, no. 2 (1973), pp. 275–305.

18 David Chandler, From Kosovo to Kabul: Human Rights and International Intervention (London: Pluto, 2002), p. 135.

19 Statement by Hugo Chavez, President of Venezuela, at the General Debate of the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 15, 2005; available at http:\\www.embavenez-us.org/news.php?nid=1745.

20 Ramesh Thakur, “No More Rwandas: Intervention, Sovereignty and the Responsibility to Protect,” Humanitarian Exchange (London: Humanitarian Protection Network, 2003); available at http:\\odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=2605.

21 This is Wheeler’s term. See Wheeler, Saving Strangers, p. 34.

22 For a discussion of the unreasonable veto argument, see Nicholas J. Wheeler and Tim Dunne, “Moral Britannia: Evaluating the Ethical Dimension in Britain’s Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy Centre, April 26, 2004, pp. 28–32; available at fpc.org.uk/fsblob/233.pdf.

23 The importance of moving beyond the sovereignty-intervention dichotomy was recognized by many of the ICISS commissioners. See Evans and Sahnoun, “The Responsibility to Protect,” p. 101; Thakur, “No More Rwandas”; Ramesh Thakur, “Iraq and the Responsibility to Protect,” Behind the Headlines 61, no. 1 (2004), pp. 1–16; and Ramesh Thakur, “Developing Countries in the Intervention-Sovereignty Debate,” in Richard M. Price and Mark W. Zacher, eds., The United Nations and Global Security (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), pp. 194–208.

24 Wheeler, “Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention,” p. 566.

25 Alex J. Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse? The Crisis in Darfur and Humanitarian Intervention after Iraq,” Ethics & International Affairs 19, no. 2 (2005), pp. 31–54.

26 This problem is raised in relation to preemption by Michael Byers, “Preemptive Self-Defense: Hegemony, Equality, and Strategies of Legal Change,” Journal of Political Philosophy 11, no. 2 (2003), p. 182.

27 Byers, “Preemptive Self-Defense,” p. 182.

28 The problem for activist nonpermanent members was exacerbated by the lack of quality information provided by the UN secretariat. After briefings by NGOs that confirmed that genocide was under way in Rwanda, the activist states were resolutely blocked by three permanent members (the United States, China, and the U.K.) and found it difficult to mobilize the nonaligned members to bring pressure to bear on the permanent members. See Colin Keating, “Rwanda: An Insider’s Account,” in David M. Malone, The UN Security Council: From the Cold War to the 21st Century (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2004), pp. 500–11.

29 Susan L. Carruthers, The Media at War (London: Macmillan, 1999), p. 220.

30 Quoted by Peter Chalk, Australian Foreign and Defence Policy in the Wake of the 1999/2000 East Timor Intervention (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND Corporation, 2001), p. 42.

31 See Michael G. Smith, Peacekeeping in East Timor: The Path to Independence (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003).

32 Wheeler, “Legitimating Humanitarian Intervention,” pp. 552–54.

33 Statement by Ban Ki-moon, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea, at the General Debate of the 60th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, September 18, 2005; available at http:\\www.un.org/webcast/ga/60/statements/kor050918eng.pdf.

34 Jennifer M. Welsh, “Conclusion: Humanitarian Intervention after 11 September,” in Jennifer M. Welsh, ed., Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 180.

35 S. Neil Macfarlane, Carolin J. Thielking, and Thomas G. Weiss, “ The Responsibility to Protect: Is Anyone Interested in Humanitarian Intervention?” Third World Quarterly 25, no. 5 (2004), p. 983.

36 Government of China, “Position Paper of the People’s Republic of China on the United Nations Reforms,” June 7, 2005, pp. 10–12; available at http:\\www.china-un.org/eng/smhwj/2005/t199101.htm. This is not a new position for China, which in 2005–6 was the largest contributor of troops to UN peace operations among the P-5.

37 See Yevgeny Primakov, “UN Process, Not Humanitarian Intervention, Is World’s Best Hope,” New Perspectives Quarterly (September 2, 2004); available at http:\\www.digitalnpq.org/global_services/global%20viewpoint/02-09-04primakov.html.

38 Welsh, “Conclusion,” p. 204, n. 4.

39 Though India proposed that the P-5 commit themselves to not vetoing “responsibility to protect” measures, a proposal rejected by the P-5. See Anita Inder Singh, “UN at Sixty: New Strategies a Must for Effectiveness,” Tribune: On-Line Edition (Chandigarh, India), September 30, 2005; available at http:\\www.tribuneindia.com/2005/20050930/edit.htm#4.

40 See Statement by Radzi Rahman, Chargé d’Affaires ai, Permanent Mission of Malaysia to the United Nations, Chairman of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-Aligned Movement, at the Informal Meeting of the Plenary of the General Assembly Concerning the Draft Outcome Document, June 21, 2005; available at http:\\www.un.int/malaysia/NAM/nam210605.html. I am grateful to the Malaysian Permanent Mission for forwarding this text to me.

41 Statement by Stafford Neil, Permanent Representative of Jamaica to the United Nations and Chairman of the Group of 77, on the Report of the Secretary-General entitled “In Larger Freedom,” April 6, 2005; available at http:\\www.g77.org/Speeches/040605.htm.

42 World Federalist Movement—Institute for Global Policy, Civil Society Perspectives on the Responsibility to Protect: Final Report (New York: World Federalist Movement, April 2003), pp. 12–14.

43 I owe this point to Justin Morris.

44 I have explored this point more thoroughly in Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect or Trojan Horse?” esp. pp. 37–40.

45 Byers, “High Ground Lost.”

46 Statement by Paul Martin, Prime Minister of Canada, at the General Debate of the 59th General Assembly, September 22, 2004; available at http:\\www.un.org/webcast/ga/59/statements/caneng040922.pdf.

47 Government of Canada, “Non-Paper on The Responsibility to Protect and the Evolution of the United Nations Peace and Security Mandate: Submission to the UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,” undated, paras. 4.1, 4.3, and 5.1–5.2; available at http:\\www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/HLPSubmissionR2P_andsynopsis-en.pdf.

48 Ramesh Thakur, “A Shared Responsibility for a More Secure World,” Global Governance 11, no. 3 (2005), p. 284.

49 Thakur, “Iraq and the Responsibility to Protect,” pp. 1–16.

50 Byers, “High Ground Lost.”

51 Wheeler, “A Victory for Common Humanity?” p. 4.

52 UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility,” A/59/565, December 2004, para. 203.

53 Ibid., para. 198.

54 Ibid., paras. 203, 207, and 257.

55 UNGA, “Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization,” A/54/1, September 20, 1999.

56 Kofi Annan, “In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All,” A/59/2005, March 2005.

57 See Ben Kioko, “The Right of Interference Under the African Union’s Constitutive Act: From Non-Interference to Non-Intervention,” International Review of the Red Cross 85, no. 6 (2003), p. 852.

58 Declaration of African Heads of State and Governments, Lome, Togo, July 12, 2002; available at http:\\www.africanreview.org/docs/arms/lome.pdf.

59 Kioko, “The Right of Intervention,” p. 817.

60 On the mission in Burundi, see Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “Who’s Keeping the Peace? Regionalization and Contemporary Peace Operations,” International Security 29, no. 4 (2005), pp. 157–95. On the AU’s mission in Sudan, see Paul D. Williams, “Military Responses to Mass Killing: The African Union Mission in Sudan,” International Peacekeeping 13, no. 2 (2006).

61 See, for instance, Philip Nel, “South Africa: The Demand for Legitimate Multilateralism,” in Albrecht Schnabel and Ramesh Thakur, eds., Kosovo and the Challenge of Humanitarian Intervention: Selective Indignation, Collective Action and International Citizenship (Tokyo: UN University Press, 2000), pp. 245–59.

62 For details on successive UN reports on the deteriorating situation in Darfur in 2005, see Bellamy, “Responsibility to Protect,” pp. 40–50. On the African position, see Williams, “Military Responses to Mass Killing.”

63 Evarist Baimu and Kathryn Sturman, “Amendment to the African Union’s Right to Intervene: A Shift From Human Security to Regime Security,” African Security Review 12, no. 2 (2003), p. 42. It is worth noting that Libya’s initial proposal for the amendment specifically identified “internal unrest.”

64 UNSC 5015th meeting, S/PV.5015, July 30, 2004, especially pp. 10–12.

65 E/CN.4/2005.8, September 27, 2004, paras. 22, 26, and 36.

66 UNSC 5040th meeting, S.PV/5040, September 18, 2004, pp. 2–3.

67 “Final Communiqué: African Mini-Summit on Darfur,” Tripoli, Libya, October 17, 2004, p. 2.

68 See Kristiana Powell, The African Union’s Emerging Peace and Security Regime, monograph no. 119 (Ottawa: North-West Institute, May 2005), p. 13.

69 African Union Executive Council, “The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations,” ext/EX.CL/2(VII), Addis Ababa, March 7–8, 2005, section B(i); available at http:\\www.africa-union.org/News_Events/Calendar_of_%20Events/7th%20extra%20ordinary%20session%20ECL/Ext%20EXCL2%20VII%20Report.pdf.

70 See Marc Weller, ed., Regional Peacekeeping and International Enforcement: The Liberian Crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge International Documents Series, vol. 6, 1994).

71 AU Executive Council, “Common African Position,” section B(i).

72 Ibid., section B(ii).

73 See Greg Puley, “The Responsibility to Protect: East, West and Southern African Perspectives on Preventing and Responding to Humanitarian Crises,” Project Ploughshares Working Paper no. 5, September 2005, p. 4; available at http:\\www.ploughshares.ca/libraries/WorkingPapers/wp055.pdf.

74 “The National Security Strategy of the United States of America September 2002,” sec. V; available at http:\\www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf.

75 Task Force on the United Nations, American Interests and UN Reform (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2005), p. 29.

76 Ibid., p. 32.

77 Letter from John R. Bolton, Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations to President Ping, President of the UN General Assembly, August 30, 2005; available at http:\\www.un.int/usa/reform-un-jrb-ltr-protect-8-05.pdf. I am very grateful to Paul D. Williams for providing me with a copy of this letter and attachments.

78 Ibid. The United States did not seek UN Security Council authorization for its intervention in Afghanistan, arguing that it was an act of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. The Security Council nevertheless passed a resolution welcoming the intervention.

79 The original draft read that the responsibility to protect “lies first and foremost” with the host state, whereas the revised draft stated that “each individual state has the responsibility to protect.” These comparisons are based on the Revised Draft Outcome Document of the High-Level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly Submitted by the President of the General Assembly, A/59/HLPM/CRP.1/Rev. 2, August 10, 2005, and the 2005 World Summit outcome document, A/60/L.1, September 15, 2005, paras. 137 and 138, unless otherwise stated.

80 As noted earlier, both China and Russia rejected any modification of the rules governing recourse to force.

81 “2005 World Summit Outcome,” A/60/L.1, September 15, 2005, para. 139.

82 Wheeler, “A Victory for Common Humanity?” p. 116.

83 See Byers, War Law, pp. 40–50.

84 Wheeler, “A Victory for Common Humanity?” p. 10.