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Sanctions as Punishment, Enforcement, and Prelude to Further Action

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2012

Patrick Clawson
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Abstract

This article looks at some major goals that have been set for sanctions and evaluates how effective sanctions have been at reaching those goals. It also examines the costs of sanctions, i.e., the impact on civilians and on international support for sanctions. Clawson concludes that sanctions are useful only as a short-term response in situations in which the world community is prepared to use force in the likely event that the target regime does not change its behavior. If there is not will to use force to back the sanctions, then the sanctions are morally dubious: they impose suffering and may cause deaths without offering a reasonable prospect of accomplishing good.

Type
Articles
Information
Ethics & International Affairs , Volume 7 , March 1993 , pp. 17 - 37
Copyright
Copyright © Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs 1993

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References

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