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Imposing a Standard: Covert Action and American Democracy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 September 2012

Gregory F. Treverton
Gregory F. Treverton
Affiliation:
GREGORY F. TREVERTON is currently a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of Covert Action: The Limits of Intervention in the Postwar World (New York: Basic Books, 1987).
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Abstract

Iran-contra and similar scandals alienate Congress and bypass the constitutional executive process. Treverton proposes four guidelines by which to test the effectiveness of covert actions undertaken by American presidents: (1) could the action stand exposure in midstream? (2) does intervention contradict overt U.S. policy? (3) what signal will be received, by whom, and with what result? (4) what if the first intervention does not succeed? The author urges presidents to abstain from implementing covert operations, which often result in nothing more than domestic and international controversy. Such decisions are the domain not of the Executive Office, but of the legitimate agency designated for such purposes, the CIA.

Type
Ethics and Intervention
Information
Ethics & International Affairs , Volume 3 , March 1989 , pp. 27 - 43
Copyright
© Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs 1989

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References

1 The distinction between prudential and ethical forms of argument has been pressed on me, first by my Harvard colleagues in a faculty seminar on ethics and public policy, especially Steven Kelman, Dennis Thompson, and Robert Reich, and then by my fellow participants in a faculty seminar, “Teaching Ethics: The Question of Covert Action in a Democracy,” sponsored by the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs. To both sets of colleagues I am gratefulGoogle Scholar.

2 Testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, December 5, 1975Google Scholar.

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