Much work in epistemology, old and new, is devoted to explaining – or explaining away – the appeal of skeptical arguments (that is, arguments designed to impugn most, if not all, of our claims to know), as well as the fact that it also often seems as if we use knowledge-attributing sentences to express truths. More recently, philosophers have sought to explain other kinds of variability in our use of knowledge-attributing sentences besides, such as the kinds of variability that occur as a result of changing what is at stake or the salience of alternative possibilities, as in scenarios such as Keith DeRose's “bank cases.” These cases, and others like them, pose a dilemma very much like that posed by skeptical arguments. For they appear to suggest that we are wrong about something. Either we speak falsely when we attribute knowledge in the situations under consideration, or we speak falsely when we deny it. Or so it would seem. This paper argues that an alternative approach to explaining the relevant variability in our use of knowledge-attributing sentences – namely, a fictionalist one – merits serious consideration.

In this paper I defend a form of epistocracy I call limited epistocracy – rule by institutions housing expertise in non-political areas that become politically relevant. This kind of limited epistocracy, I argue, isn't a far-off fiction. With increasing frequency, governments are outsourcing political power to expert institutions to solve urgent, multidimensional problems because they outperform ordinary democratic decision-making. I consider the objection that limited epistocracy, while more effective than its competitors, lacks a fundamental intrinsic value that its competitors have; namely, political inclusion. After explaining this challenge, I suggest that limited epistocracies can be made compatible with robust political inclusion if specialized institutions are confined to issuing directives that give citizens multiple actionable options. I explain how this safeguards citizens’ inclusion through rational deliberation, choice, and contestation.

In the literature on conspiracy theories, the least contentious part of the academic discourse would appear to be what we mean by a “conspiracy”: a secretive plot between two or more people toward some end. Yet what, exactly, is the connection between something being a conspiracy and it being secret? Is it possible to conspire without also engaging in secretive behavior? To dissect the role of secrecy in conspiracies – and thus contribute to the larger debate on the epistemology of conspiracy theories – we define the concepts of “conspiracy,” “conspirator,” and “secret,” and argue that while conspirators might typically be thought to commit to keeping secrets once their conspiracy is underway, the idea that conspiracies are necessarily secretive to start with is not as obvious as previously thought.

I argue elsewhere (Roche 2014) that evidence of evidence is evidence under screening-off. Tal and Comesaña (2017) argue that my appeal to screening-off is subject to two objections. They then propose an evidence of evidence thesis involving the notion of a defeater. There is much to learn from their very careful discussion. I argue, though, that their objections fail and that their evidence of evidence thesis is open to counterexample.

What's the evidential impact of learning that something is a mystery? To answer this question, we first explicate the notion of a mystery in terms of unexplainability. After distinguishing different ways in which something can be unexplainable, we develop a test to evaluate the evidential impact of two distinct types of unexplainables: symmetrical and asymmetrical unexplainables. We argue that only asymmetrical unexplainables have evidential impact. We finally clarify how our explication of mysteries as unexplainables complements existing accounts of abduction and contributes to the literature on the mystery of consciousness.

According to a recent account of epistemic authority proposed by Linda Zagzebski (2012), it is rational for laypersons to believe on authority when they conscientiously judge that the authority is more likely to form true beliefs and avoid false ones than they are in some domain. Christoph Jäger (2016) has recently raised several objections to her view. By contrast, I argue that both theories fail to adequately capture what epistemic authority is, and I offer an alternative account grounded in the abilities that different kinds of authorities are required to possess.