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WHEN THE EXPERTS ARE UNCERTAIN: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE ETHICS OF DEMOCRATIC JUDGMENT

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 November 2013

Melissa Lane
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Abstract

Can ordinary citizens in a democracy evaluate the claims of scientific experts? While a definitive answer must be case by case, some scholars have offered sharply opposed general answers: a skeptical “no” (e.g. Scott Brewer) versus an optimistic “yes, no problem” (e.g. Elizabeth Anderson). The article addresses this basic conflict, arguing that a satisfactory answer requires a first-order engagement in judging the claims of experts which both skeptics and optimists rule out in taking the issue to be one of second-order assessments only. Having argued that such first-order judgments are necessary, it then considers how they are possible, outlining a range of practices and virtues that can inform their success and likelihood, and drawing throughout on ancient Greek insights as well as contemporary social psychology and sociology of knowledge. In conclusion the ethics of democratic judgment so developed is applied to the dramatic conviction of the members of an Italian scientific risk commission in L'Aquila.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 11 , Issue 1 , March 2014 , pp. 97 - 118
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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