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What's the Point of “Knowledge” Anyway?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Abstract

In Knowledge and the State of Nature Edward Craig defends the thesis that the function of the concept of knowledge is to flag good informants. This paper aims to show that Craig's thesis (CT) is false. In order to establish this, I will point to some data that CT fails to explain in a satisfactory manner. I will then introduce an alternative thesis that is not only able to secure the acclaimed benefits of CT, but also provides a neat explanation of the recalcitrant data.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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References

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