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The Stability of Philosophical Intuitions: Failed Replications of Swain et al. (2008)

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 August 2019

Adrian Ziółkowski Open the ORCID record for Adrian Ziółkowski [Opens in a new window]
Adrian Ziółkowski*
Affiliation:
Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw
*
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

In their widely cited article, Swain et al. (2008) report data that, purportedly, demonstrates instability of folk epistemic intuitions regarding the famous Truetemp case authored by Keith Lehrer. What they found is a typical example of priming, where presenting one stimulus before presenting another stimulus affects the way the latter is perceived or evaluated. In their experiment, laypersons were less likely to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp case when they first read a scenario describing a clear case of knowledge, and more likely to ascribe knowledge when they first read a vignette describing a clear case of nonknowledge. We tried to replicate Swain et al. findings in three experiments: one devised in Polish, and the other two conducted in English. We found no priming effect for knowledge ratings regarding the Truetemp case – laypersons were similarly likely to attribute knowledge in all three investigated conditions (primed with a clear case of knowledge, primed with a clear case of nonknowledge, and not primed). These three failed replication attempts are not decisive as to whether the priming effect in question occurs, nevertheless, the collected data puts Swain et al. conclusions about instability of epistemic intuitions in jeopardy.

Keywords

experimental philosophyreplicationepistemic intuitionsknowledge attributionspriming effectTruetemp case
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , June 2021 , pp. 328 - 346
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019

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