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SPEAKERS ARE HONEST BECAUSE HEARERS ARE VIGILANT REPLY TO KOURKEN MICHAELIAN1

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 March 2013

Dan Sperber
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Abstract

In ‘The Evolution of Testimony: Receiver Vigilance, Speaker Honesty and the Reliability of Communication,’ Kourken Michaelian questions the basic tenets of our article ‘Epistemic Vigilance’ (Sperber et al. 2010). Here I defend against Michaelian's criticisms the view that epistemic vigilance plays a major role in explaining the evolutionary stability of communication and that the honesty of speakers and the reliability of their testimony are, to a large extent, an effect of hearers' vigilance.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 10 , Issue 1 , March 2013 , pp. 61 - 71
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013

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Footnotes

1

I am grateful to Fabrice Clément, Christophe Heintz, Olivier Mascaro, Hugo Mercier, Gloria Origgi, and Deirdre Wilson for their suggestions and comments.

References

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