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Re-thinking the Duplication of Speaker/Hearer Belief in the Epistemology of Testimony†

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Joel Buenting
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Abstract

Most epistemologists of testimony assume that testifying requires that the beliefs to which speakers attest are identical to the beliefs that hearers accept. I argue that this characterization of testimony is misleading. Characterizing testimony in terms of duplicating speaker/hearer belief unduly resticts the variety of beliefs that might be accepted from speaker testimony.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 2 , Issue 2 , June 2006 , pp. 129 - 134
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2006

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