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REPLY TO GOLDMAN: CUTTING UP THE ONE TO SAVE THE FIVE IN EPISTEMOLOGY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 June 2015

Selim Berker
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Abstract

I argue that Alvin Goldman has failed to save process reliabilism from my critique in earlier work of consequentialist or teleological epistemic theories. First, Goldman misconstrues the nature of my challenge: two of the cases he discusses I never claimed to be counterexamples to process reliabilism. Second, Goldman's reply to the type of case I actually claimed to be a counterexample to process reliabilism is unsuccessful. He proposes a variety of responses, but all of them either feature an implausible restriction on process types, or fail to rule out cases with the sort of structure that generates the worry, or both.

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Articles
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Episteme , Volume 12 , Special Issue 2: 10th Anniversary of Episteme , June 2015 , pp. 145 - 153
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

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