Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-p9bg8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-30T21:57:54.933Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

RELIABILITY AND KNOWLEDGE IN THE EPISTEMOLOGY OF TESTIMONY

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 May 2015

Jennifer Lackey
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

What is at the center of the epistemology of testimony: reliability or knowledge? This is the key question that Elizabeth Fricker takes up in her “How to Make Invidious Distinctions Amongst Reliable Testifiers.” In particular, Fricker argues that there are several important reasons to favor understanding testimonial knowledge in terms of the speaker being a knower rather than merely a reliable source of information. In this short response, I raise problems for Fricker’s view and the arguments put forth to support it. I conclude that contrary to Fricker’s thesis, the epistemology of testimony should focus on speaker reliability rather than knowledge.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 12 , Special Issue 2: 10th Anniversary of Episteme , June 2015 , pp. 203 - 208
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Fricker, E. 2015a. ‘How to Make Invidious Distinctions Amongst Reliable Testifiers.’ Episteme doi: 10.1017/epi.2015.6.Google Scholar
Fricker, E. 2015b. ‘Know First, Tell Later: The Truth about Craig on Knowledge.’ In Greco, J. and Henderson, D. (eds), Epistemic Evaluations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lackey, J. 1999. ‘Testimonial Knowledge and Transmission.’ Philosophical Quarterly 49: 471–90.Google Scholar
Lackey, J. 2007. ‘Norms of Assertion.’ Noûs 41: 594–626.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lackey, J. 2008. Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Lackey, J. 2011. ‘Assertion and Isolated Secondhand Knowledge.’ In Brown, J. and Cappelen, H. (eds), Assertion, pp. 251–75. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar