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RELIABILISM, VERITISM, AND EPISTEMIC CONSEQUENTIALISM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 May 2015

Alvin I. Goldman
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Abstract

According to Selim Berker the prevalence of consequentialism in contemporary epistemology rivals its prevalence in contemporary ethics. Similarly, and more to the point, Berker finds epistemic consequentialism, epitomized by process reliabilism, to be as misguided and problematic as ethical consequentialism. This paper shows how Berker misconstrues process reliabilism and fails to pinpoint any new or substantial defects in it.

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Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 12 , Special Issue 2: 10th Anniversary of Episteme , June 2015 , pp. 131 - 143
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

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