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Recognizing Levels of Justification: To Add or to Subtract

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 October 2019

Richard Fumerton
Richard Fumerton*
Affiliation:
University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA, USA
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

In this paper I explore the idea of developing something like Sosa's influential distinction between cognitio and scientia (animal knowledge and reflective knowledge) to epistemic justification. On the assumption that we should, I explore the question of whether we should do so by either (1) beginning with a really basic, intellectually undemanding kind of justification, recognizing more sophisticated intellectually rewarding justification by layering more demanding requirements on that basic sort, or (2) beginning with an ideal sort of justification and recognizing less demanding sorts of justification by stripping away conditions from that ideal justification.

Keywords

JustificationSosaanimal and reflective knowledge
Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 16 , Special Issue 4: 2018 Episteme Conference in Honor of Ernest Sosa , December 2019 , pp. 385 - 394
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2019 

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