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REASONS FOR REASONS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 May 2015

Baron Reed
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Abstract

Hilary Kornblith explores the prospects for reasons eliminationism, the view that reasons ought not to be regarded as being of central importance in epistemology. I reply by conceding that reasons may not be necessary for knowledge, in at least some cases, but I argue that they are nevertheless vitally important in epistemology more broadly. Their importance stems from being necessary, not for knowledge but for us, given that we are social agents with practical concerns. In that sense, we have (social and practical) reasons for (having a practice of giving and receiving epistemic) reasons.

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Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 12 , Special Issue 2: 10th Anniversary of Episteme , June 2015 , pp. 241 - 247
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

REFERENCES

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