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PEER DISAGREEMENT AND THE DUNNING-KRUGER EFFECT

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  09 September 2016

Eric Wiland
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Abstract

I argue that recent evidence about our self-serving biases has radical implications for the epistemology of peer disagreement. I conclude that much of the time when you are disagreeing with someone you regard as your epistemic peer, you should not merely move halfway to her judgment, as The Equal Weight View has it. That is not conciliatory enough. Surprisingly often, you should be at least weakly confident that you are wrong, and that your disputant is right.

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Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 14 , Issue 4 , December 2017 , pp. 481 - 498
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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