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NO CROSS-CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN THE GETTIER CAR CASE INTUITION: A REPLICATION STUDY OF WEINBERG ET AL. 2001

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 March 2015

Minsun Kim  and
Yuan Yuan
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Abstract

In “Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions” (NEI), Weinberg, Nichols and Stich famously argue from empirical data that East Asians and Westerners have different intuitions about Gettier-style cases. We attempted to replicate their study about the Gettier Car Case. Our study used the same methods and case taken verbatim, but sampled an East Asian population 2.5 times greater than NEI's 23 participants. We found no evidence supporting the existence of cross-cultural difference about the intuition concerning the case. Taken together with the failures of both of the existing replication studies (Nagel et al. 2013; Seyedsayamdost 2014), our data provide strong evidence that the purported cross-cultural difference in intuitions about Gettier-style cases does not exist.

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Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 12 , Issue 3 , September 2015 , pp. 355 - 361
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

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