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KNOWING WHAT'S NOT UP THE ROAD BY SEEING WHAT'S RIGHT IN FRONT OF YOU: EPISTEMOLOGICAL DISJUNCTIVISM'S FAKE BARN PROBLEM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 May 2015

Michael Veber
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Abstract

Epistemological Disjunctivism (ED) is the view that rational support for paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge that P comes from seeing that P – a state that is both factive and reflectively accessible. ED has the consequence that if I see that there is a barn before me, I can thereby be in a position to know that I am not in fake barn country. It is argued that this is a problem. The problem is distinct from familiar complaints about Neo-Mooreanism and easy knowledge. Potential ways of avoiding this problem are proposed. It is argued that they do not succeed. There is a way out of ED's fake barn problem but many will likely find it inhospitable.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 12 , Issue 3 , September 2015 , pp. 401 - 412
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

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