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KNOWING OUR DEGREES OF BELIEF

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  22 October 2015

Sinan Dogramaci
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Abstract

The main question of this paper is: how do we manage to know what our own degrees of belief are? Section 1 briefly reviews and criticizes the traditional functionalist view, a view notably associated with David Lewis and sometimes called the theory-theory. I use this criticism to motivate the approach I want to promote. Section 2, the bulk of the paper, examines and begins to develop the view that we have a special kind of introspective access to our degrees of belief. I give an initial assessment of the view by examining its compatibility with leading theories of introspection. And I identify a challenge for the view, and explain why I'm optimistic that the view can overcome it.

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Articles
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Episteme , Volume 13 , Issue 3 , September 2016 , pp. 269 - 287
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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