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IS KNOWLEDGE THE ABILITY TO ϕ FOR THE REASON THAT P?
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 06 June 2014
Abstract
Hyman (1999, 2006) argues that knowledge is best conceived as a kind of ability: S knows that p iff S can ϕ for the reason that p. Hyman motivates this thesis by appealing to Gettier cases. I argue that it is counterexampled by a certain kind of Gettier case where the fact that p is a cause of the subject's belief that p. One can ϕ for the reason that p even if one does not know that p. So knowledge is not best conceived as an ability of this kind.
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