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In Defense of Epistemic Relativism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Ram Neta
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Abstract

In Fear of Knowledge, Paul Boghossian argues against various forms of epistemic relativism. In this paper, I criticize Boghossian’s arguments against a particular variety of relativism. I then argue in favor of a thesis that is very similar to this variety of relativism.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , February 2007 , pp. 30 - 48
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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References

REFERENCES

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