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FACING INCONSISTENCY: THEORIES AND OUR RELATIONS TO THEM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 November 2013

Michaelis Michael
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Abstract

Classical logic is explosive in the face of contradiction, yet we find ourselves using inconsistent theories. Mark Colyvan, one of the prominent advocates of the indispensability argument for realism about mathematical objects, suggests that such use can be garnered to develop an argument for commitment to inconsistent objects and, because of that, a paraconsistent underlying logic. I argue to the contrary that it is open to a classical logician to make distinctions, also needed by the paraconsistent logician, which allow a more nuanced ranking of theories in which inconsistent theories can have different degrees of usefulness and productivity. Facing inconsistency does not force us to adopt an underlying paraconsistent logic. Moreover we will see that the argument to best explanation deployed by Colyvan in this context is unsuccessful. I suggest that Quinean approach which Colyvan champions will not lead to the revolutionary doctrines Colyvan endorses.

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Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 10 , Issue 4 , December 2013 , pp. 351 - 367
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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