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Epistemic Value Theory and Judgment Aggregation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Don Fallis
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Extract

We frequently make judgments about the world. Juries make judgments about whether defendants are guilty. Umpires make judgments about whether pitches are strikes. Tenure committees make judgments about whether professors deserve tenure. We typically want these judgments about the world to have good epistemic properties. We would like our judgments to be true rather than false, for example. We would also like our judgments to be consistent with each other; and we would like to have good reasons for our judgments. This paper will be concerned with how we can make judgments that have such good epistemic properties.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 2 , Issue 1 , June 2005 , pp. 39 - 55
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2005

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