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Dr Livingstone, I Presume?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 August 2021

Pascal Engel
Pascal Engel*
Affiliation:
EHESS, Paris, France
*
Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Presumption is often discussed in law, less often in epistemology. Is it an attitude? If so where can we locate it within the taxonomy of epistemic attitudes? Is it a kind of belief, a judgment, an assumption or a supposition? Or is it a species of inference? There are two basic models of presumption: judgmental, as a kind of judgment, and legal, taken from the use of presumptions in law. The legal model suggests that presumption is a practical inference, whereas the judgmental model suggests that presumption is an epistemic attitude. I argue that presumption is neither a practical inference nor a merely epistemic attitude: it involves both, within the category of what we may call the inquiring attitudes.

Keywords

Presumptionassumptionabductiondoxastic attitudespractical reasoninginquiryEdna Ullman-MargalitDouglas Walton
Type
Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 18 , Special Issue 3: Episteme Conference Special Issue , September 2021 , pp. 477 - 491
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press

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