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Conservatism, Basic Beliefs, and the Diachronic and Social Nature of Epistemic Justification

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Jeremy Koons
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Abstract

Discussions of conservatism in epistemology often fail to demonstrate that the principle of conservatism is supported by epistemic considerations. In this paper, I hope to show two things. First, there is a defensible version of the principle of conservatism, a version that applies only to what I will call our basic beliefs. Those who deny that conservatism is supported by epistemic considerations do so because they fail to take into account the necessarily social, diachronic and self-correcting nature of our epistemic practice. Second, I will attempt to show how our basic beliefs are justified via this principle of conservatism.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 2 , Issue 3 , October 2006 , pp. 203 - 218
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2005

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