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CHANCE, CREDENCE AND CIRCLES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  08 March 2017

Fabrizio Cariani
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Abstract

I target Pettigrew's application of the accuracy framework to derive chance-credence principles. My principal contention is that Pettigrew's preferred version of the argument might in one sense be circular and, moreover, that Pettigrew's premises have content that goes beyond that of standard chance-credence principles.

Type
Symposium: Pettigrew's Accuracy and the Laws of Credence
Information
Episteme , Volume 14 , Issue 1 , March 2017 , pp. 49 - 58
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2017 

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